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Abstract
The three districts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh have the highest
military presence in Bangladesh. Following its emergence as an independent country in
1971, the military carried out a campaign of systematic repression of the Jumma
indigenous people of the region. In this thesis, I focus on tourism and argue it is one of
the ways by which ruling elites expropriate Jumma lands and circumvent indigenous land
and cultural rights. The process is riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, violence
against the Jumma has not ceased, and instead, the presence of the military has become
normalized. On the other hand, the state promotes the Hills as a tourist site where tourists
may enjoy the landscape and the ‘exotic’ inhabitants. I contextualize this conflict within
the historical legacy of British colonialism, and the subsequent emergence of smaller
nation-states that inherited colonial categories and institutions.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The political economy of tourism in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts
This thesis explores how the Bangladeshi state subjugates the indigenous Jumma
people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (thereafter Hills) and confiscates their land through
military-controlled tourism. I look at the normalization of militarization through low-key
every day violence that accompanies ‘development’ through tourism. Bangladesh is an
example of an ‘integral’ state that uses both coercion (policy and army) and the means of
hegemonic power in civil society to harness consensus to expand on indigenous lands.
The economic and political returns of this expansion by mainly land expropriation are
mainly reaped by Bengali elites.
The thesis shows that analyzing the tourist industry in the Hills reveals the
inherently contradictory state discourses, which on the one hand attribute a pristine
indigenous cultural distinction to the inhabitants and on the other hand, the state has been
and continues to eradicate and repress indigenous cultural identification if and when it is
invoked to make political or economic claims, in this case autonomous status, or simply
the right to owning and living on their land. From a historical perspective, this case
shows that British colonialism left an indelible mark on Bangladesh, and set the stage for
present-day conflicts and social schisms. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the
Hills and its political significance in Bangladesh, followed by a discussion of why I chose
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this as the area of my research, as well as the methodology I used for the research project.
I conclude with the theorists and theoretical concepts I draw upon in my study.
Entering the Field
It was a public holiday on August 15, 2016 on the occasion of the 41st death
anniversary of the “Father of the Nation” of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. My
companion Rahnuma Ahmed, an anthropologist, and I had just arrived in Khagrachari
district of the Hills very early that morning in an overnight bus. We had breakfast at
Samari Chakma’s house before getting into a converted four-wheel-drive vehicle
specifically designed to transport tourists to the hilly area of Sajek, 67 kilometers from
Khagrachari town. Samari became the first Chakma woman in Bangladesh to get a
license to practice law in the Supreme Court of the country in 2016. A long-time student
activist in the Jumma people’s struggle for self-determination, she had been the president
of the Hill Women’s Federation (HWF) for more than a decade. In 1997 when the CHT
Accord was signed she was one of the leading figures in opposing it.
The Accord ended the formal Jumma armed resistance movement and caused a
split in the group between those who supported the Accord, the Parbattya Chattagram
Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) and those who opposed the Accord, who later organized
and formed the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). Samari became an activist in
the women’s organization that fell under the umbrella of the UPDF. But she and her
fellow feminist activists soon realized that the fight for the rights of the Jumma women
2

needed to be carried out in the courtroom as much as on the streets. Her frustration with
the slow and biased legal system prompted her to become a practicing lawyer at the age
of thirty-seven.
The ‘chander gari’ (moon vehicle) that was scheduled to take us to Sajek was
waiting outside Samari’s house in Mahajanpara at nine in the morning. The schools were
off for the day but the children did not really have the day off. They were all required to
march through the small town of Khagrachari to pay respect to the country’s ‘founding
father’ (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) and first president of the independent country. He was
also the father of the present prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, who had inherited the party
leadership of Awami League (AL) after his death. In 1975 a military coup had
assassinated almost all the members of the extended Sheikh family. Sheikh Hasina and
her sister Sheikh Rehana had survived the attack as they were not in the country at the
time.
Sheikh Mujib had a major role in leading the movement for self-determination of
the Bengali people in the post-Partition period. In the then East Pakistan he was the
revolutionary leader who refused to bow down to West Pakistan’s political and economic
marginalization of its eastern part. Between one to three million mostly Bengalis were
killed by the Pakistan army during the war of 1971. Whereas Pakistan was supported by
the United States, East Pakistan received support from India and Russia. West Pakistan
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was forced to withdraw its troops after nine months of war and consequently Bangladesh
became an independent nation-state.
However, Sheikh Mujib lost his popularity among indigenous peoples when he
refused to recognize the people of the Hills, calling upon the Jummas to assimilate and
‘become Bengali’ (Mohsin 2000). His policies played a considerable role in fueling the
Jumma people’s armed movement for self-determination. The commemoration of Mujib
as the ‘father of the nation’ in Khagrachari and other parts of the Hills hence carries a
menacing message for the Jummas.
The chander gari trip to Sajek took us approximately three hours. At the Shapla
Chottor (central part of Khagrachari) we were stuck in a traffic jam for about 20 minutes.
Most of the walls in the town were plastered with ‘Shok Dibosh’ (National Day of
mourning) posters. The design of the posters did not vary much - Sheikh Mujib’s bustsize photo featured in all of them with the splatter of blood for a dramatic appearance.
Most of the processions were by school children with loudspeakers blaring what sounded
like Mujib’s famous 7th March speech declaring non-cooperation with the West Pakistan
government. The Shapla Chottor stage was set for the programme. Just beyond the busy
town center the hills were very steep and daunting at times. However, our driver Mintu
Chakma knew exactly when to speed up and slow down and made the driving look like
cakewalk. His two companions Bablu and Jelen provided occasional instructions.
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On our way to Sajek we passed through Boalkhali Union, the Maini River and
Dighinala Cantonment which is one of the largest and one of the six army cantonments
under the 24th Infantry Division of the Bangladesh Military in the Hills, established in the
1970s. Although Sajek Valley is situated in Sajek Union in Baghaichhari Upazila that
falls within the Rangamati District, there are no roads linking Sajek directly with
Rangamati town and the fastest land route to the area is through Khagrachhari.
All tourists therefore have to enter Khagrachari town first, exit it through
Dighinala and re-enter Rangamati through Baghaichhari - having to pass through two
entry and one exit checkpoints. Baghaichhari is the village home of Kalpana Chakma.
Kalpana was a fiery activist who was abducted by the military in 1996, a day before the
countrywide general elections where she was campaigning for the local Jumma candidate
Bijoy Ketan Chakma. She still remains missing and despite numerous investigations and
much evidence about the day from her brothers who were eye-witnesses to the abduction,
the state has failed to bring justice. On the way there we noticed a signpost pointing to
Marisya, Kalpana’s home. At Baghaihat all vehicles and passengers had to be registered
at a military checkpoint before entering. Finally, after nearly three hours of driving we
reached Ruilui Para in Sajek.
In 2007-8 the country went through a two-year state of emergency with a
suspension of all normal constitutional procedures which was declared by the military
following violence between the two main political parties, the Bangladesh Awami
5

League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In April of 2008 about 70
homes belonging to Jumma people were burned down in several villages of Sajek, about
an hour’s drive from Ruilui Para. The attack received a lot of national media attention
and condemnations by human rights activists who visited the area demanding an
independent investigation to bring the perpetrators to justice. The situation in Sajek
continued to remain volatile and in February 2010 there was yet another attack in the
same area and this time 400 homes, of mostly the Jummas, were burned down. Several
eye-witnesses said that members of the security forces were present when the attacks
took place. Two Jumma villagers were shot and killed by military officers. With the
military taking over the road construction work in Sajek (leading up to the border of India
in Mizoram) it seemed that Sajek was being prepared for something. Exacerbating the
violence in the area, Sajek, and many other parts of the Hills are regularly affected by
acute food shortages, the latest one hitting the area in April 2017 and affecting more than
500 families there. Thus, Sajek represents the paradox of becoming a tourist site, yet is
one of poorest and most policed and violent areas of the country. The paradox, however,
is explained when one realizes that the state controls and manages both the tourist
industry and the violence.
Since 2013 Sajek has become one of the most popular destinations for young,
Bengali middle-class tourists from the cities. There are many attractive aspects to Sajek,
some of which are promoted in advertising brochures: it is regarded as an adventure for
young tourists, it is physically remote and hilly, it is close to the Indian border, and it is
6

inhabited by Jumma indigenous people with their distinctive cultural life. In a manner of
speaking, it is promoted as a ‘safe’ adventure, because the state provides full protection to
tourists, evidenced by the presence of the military and police, along with several military
checkpoints. In fact, the Chittagong Hill Tracts is the only fully militarized area in
Bangladesh, and despite a formal Accord signed between the Jumma people and the
Government of Bangladesh in 1997, the area has an overwhelming presence of security
forces. Moreover, ethnic tension between the Jummas and Bengali settler groups is
pervasive, violence against Jumma women continues with impunity, and cracks and
fissures continue to widen between indigenous political groups themselves. Within such a
setting however, the Bangladesh military has been consolidating its presence in the Hills
through its corporate interest in tourism, which has become the façade to expropriate
indigenous land.
A primer on the term ‘Jumma’ as used in the thesis
Throughout the thesis I use the term ‘Jumma’, which literally means ‘those who
do jhum or swidden cultivation’. It is used as a collective term to refer to at least 11
different indigenous groups that have inhabited the Hills for generations including the
Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Chak, Pankhoya, Mro, Bawm, Lushai, Khyang,
and Khumi. There are other terms used to refer to the indigenous peoples of the Hills
including ‘Pahari’ (a Bengali word meaning ‘hill people’ and not accepted by many),
‘Upajati’ (used in the CHT Accord it literally means ‘sub-national’ and is considered
7

derogatory) and ‘Nri-goshthi’ (used in government documents meaning ‘anthropological
people’ and not considered an acceptable term). The term ‘adibashi’ or ‘indigenous’ is
also rejected by some groups, the former being a Bengali word and the latter according to
some is an identifier of neo-liberalism as it is a popular term used by the United Nations.
The term ‘Jumma’ was used initially by Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati
Samity (PCJSS) as a signifier for the collective struggle for self-determination against the
state. Historian Willem van Schendel indicated in his research that the term ‘Jumma’ was
used as a mark of deﬁance and a protest against attempts at forced assimilation into
Bengali culture and as a way ‘to cope with the political and economic consequences of
loss of power, growing expendability to the state and cultural marginalization’ (Schendel
1992). However, there is also critique of this term. According to Mohsin (2000), the term
was used pejoratively by Bengalis to denote the people as primitive and backward
farmers. She also found that Marmas and Tripuras did not accept this term because it was
a Chakma word and reinforced Chakma hegemony especially because the PCJSS was
strongly dominated by Chakma, and the Chakmas were also the largest ‘minority’ in the
Hills. Therefore, I acknowledge in my thesis that there is no common consensus over a
general acceptable term and any common term used to describe different indigenous
groups has the tendency to essentialize. All the various terms used by different groups
could be said to be a form of strategic essentialism (Spivak 1987), a form of essentialism
used for strategic advocacy and resistance.
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Tourism as Erasure and Establishment of a Nationalist Narrative
By 2014 the military had set up two luxury resorts on Ruilui Para, Sajek, about 35
kilometers from the villages where homes had been burnt down. The military had labeled
Sajek the ‘Switzerland of Bangladesh’. Someone in the media mentioned that it was
‘more beautiful than the Darjeeling’ of India. Sajek has now become one of the most
popular tourist destinations in Bangladesh. Unsurprisingly, on the military website that
promotes Sajek’s tourism, there is no mention of either the recent history of violence in
Sajek, or the history of massacres carried out by the military in the Hills. The history
section is sanitized to erase the Jumma people’s struggle for self-determination. There are
many examples of such erasure in other parts of the world where original inhabitants
have been evicted from their homeland to accommodate powerful state-backed settlers.
For example, there are many parallels to this situation in Canada, such as the Oka
Resistance where the Mohawks First Nations resisted the Canadian government’s
encroachment on their land in 1990 in Oka, Quebec. Similarly, the erasure of the
Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) when the Palestinians were ethnically cleansed in 1948
has been consistently absented from public and dominant histories, a topic that a number
of scholars have been trying to bring attention to, such as Sa’di and Abu Lughod (2007).
According to the editors, in the Western public domain, the dominant narrative is of
Israel’s creation based on biblical origins, which overshadows the violence carried out
against the Palestinians in 1948 when they were ethnically cleansed from their ancestral
lands. In this narrative, Palestinians are portrayed as refugees with no history. In their
9

work the scholars point out, “memory is one of the few weapons available to those
against whom the tide of history has turned. It contributes to a counter-history” (p. 6). In
the Palestinian case, like that of the Jumma, the wound remains open: the Nakba of 1948
did not end, but Israeli violence, and colonial expansion on the Palestinian land continues
to this day (Sa’di and Abu Lughod 2007). In his work on social memory, Connerton
(1989) observes that if the memory of past injustices live on, and those injustices have
shaped the structure of a society’s present, then it is very important to take efforts to
rectify them. The state-led violence that continued for over two decades in the Hills has
never been addressed or even acknowledged. However, the Jumma people remember the
everyday horror of that period, the memory lives on, at a time when state violence
continues.
The Jummas of the Hills have a long history of resistance that dates back to
colonial times. They have resisted economic exploitation by the British authorities, and
their marginalization by Pakistan and the present-day Bangladeshi governments. The
Bangladeshi state’s response to Jumma resistance has been overwhelmingly repressive
and often violent. The Jumma and other indigenous groups have been subjected to
surveillance, massacres, torture, and rape, as well as land-grabbing by government
officials and private corporations. The CHT Accord signed in 1997 was intended to
resolve the conflict. However, it failed to settle the land disputes between Jummas on the
one hand, and the state, Bengali settlers, private corporations and the Bengali elite on the
other. Instead, since then the Hills have become open to corporate interests and for land
10

expansion, and caused a fracture between the Jumma political leaders. In addition,
following the Accord the ethnic divide between the Bengalis and the Jumma has
continued to grow. Within this backdrop tourism has become a new tool to obfuscate and
violate Jumma rights, normalize surveillance and militarization, and establish a neoliberal
strategy to give an appearance of peace while advancing the interests of ruling elites.
The study looks at the broader effects of tourism and its complicity with state
power, which operates on a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, the tourist industry has
been used to alienate and dispossess Jumma from their traditional land, and enforcing
Bengali majoritarian politics; on the other hand, it treats the Jumma and their cultural
practices as exotic and profitable products for tourist consumption. Hooks (2009) argues
that when race and ethnicity become commodified as resources for pleasure, “the culture
of specific groups, as well as the bodies of individuals can be seen as constituting an
alternative playground where members of dominating races, genders, sexual practices
affirm their power-over in intimate relations with the Other” (p.367).
Similarly, in his work on tourism, Hall (2007) emphasized the importance of
looking at power and politics implicated in tourism, especially ‘ethnic tourism’. He
asserted that tourism never happens in a vacuum, and in terms of tourism in indigenous
people’s areas, it is very political and related to power. This implies prioritizing
commodification and representation of heritage and identity when an area is promoted for
tourists. In this process, various individuals, interest groups, political parties, private
11

corporations, and the government’s tourism board are involved in these decisions,
underscoring how the struggle for power and control is at the core of tourism
development. This entwining of state power and tourism is clear in the case of the Hills in
Bangladesh, where the military-industrial institutions and the political elite are heavily
invested in tourism.
However, before analyzing the present situation, it is necessary to provide a brief
historical background on the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign post-colonial
nation-state and its strategies to maintain hegemonic power. It is also important to have a
deeper knowledge of its relationship to indigenous people, the process of minoritization,
and a broader understanding of tourism and particularly ‘touristic ethnicity’ as defined by
Robert E. Wood, and its ramifications (Wood 1998).
Bangladesh is a small country in South Asia with an area of 147,570 squarekilometers. With a population of 169 million people (2011 census), it is the 10th most
densely-populated country in the world. Bengalis make up nearly 98 percent of the
population. The rest are mostly indigenous peoples who live in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts, with a smaller number spread across the other 61 districts of the country, as well
as Urdu-speaking populations.
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Topographical Background of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
The Chittagong Hill Tracts is located in the southeastern corner of the country
under the Chittagong Division, which is one of the eight administrative divisions of
Bangladesh. The Hills consist of three districts: Khagrachari, Bandarban and Rangamati.
Khagrachari shares borders with the Indian state of Tripura on the North and West,
Rangamati shares its borders with the Indian Mizoram on the East, and Bandarban shares
its border with Myanmar on the South and South-East. The first known migration to the
lands started in the 1400s when communities known as the Kukis arrived there from
Myanmar (Chowdhury 2016). Under the Mughal Empire, since the 1660s, this frontier
region between the Lushai Hills, Tripura and Arakan, was referred to as Kapas Mahal
(region of cotton). It was in 1860 that the 13,295 square-kilometre area consisting of
forests, hills and lake, was named the Chittagong Hill Tracts by the British when they
incorporated it under the colonial state. The Jumma people in the Hills consist of the
Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Mro, Bawm, Pankhoya, Lushai, Khumi, Khyang,
and Chak. The Chakmas are the largest community of Jummas. However, since the 1970s
Bengalis make up at least 50 percent of those living in the Hills.
Throughout the two and a half decades of armed rebellion the military burned the
homes of the Jummas, carried out mass killings and rape of Jumma women and as a
strategy, placed Bengali settlers as ‘human shields’ (IWGIA, 2012) on the land of the
Jummas near the military camps. This has exacerbated violence, whereby Bengali settlers
13

attack the Jumma with impunity, which is condoned by the state. The state itself also
continues to intimidate the Jummas through the security forces in the Hills, and by
fueling violence between Bengalis and Jummas, and between the two main Jumma
political groups. In recent times, the news that dominates the Hills has mostly been about
the violence in the area, what the media likes to label as ‘Pahari-Bengali ethnic conflict’.
The Bangladesh government announced 2016 as Tourism Year and through the
Bangladesh Tourism Board (BTB) and Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation (BPC), they
planned to promote tourism by organizing year-round events until 2018. In general,
tourism is seen as an industry that leads to economic development, especially in poor
countries. Thus, most of the research done on tourism in Bangladesh itself and tourism in
particular, focused on the economic aspect. Eco-tourism has received a great deal of
attention since the 1990s. There is a popular perception that eco-tourism is
environmentally sustainable, while concurrently providing tourists with a special
experience when visiting an ‘authentic’ indigenous people and region. However, the
development of tourism in the Hills is being executed without the involvement of the
Jummas.
According to Jumma advocacy organizations, at least 1700 acres of land have
been allocated to build tourist resorts (including by the military and private corporations),
which resulted in the eviction of at least 700 Jumma families from 26 villages (Chakma
and Chakma 2015). In 2015, the government planned to acquire nearly 700 acres of land
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in Alutila, Khagrachari (70km from Sajek where I conducted my ethnographic fieldwork
this year) which would evict 300 Jumma families from their homes. The project has
recently been put on hold after protests by local Jummas and activists. Another example
of how tourism has negatively affected indigenous populations is the military resort in
Nilgiri in the Bandarban hill district which led to the eviction of 200 Mro and Marma
families from six villages in the area.
The increased presence of Bengali tourists helps to normalize the militarization of
the region and grant it a non-threatening appearance, something that I observed during
my fieldwork this year. Underpinning this state-sponsored tourism is a paradox and
contradiction: on the one hand, the state aims to promote tourism, on the other hand, the
military and the local administration order the restriction of communication between
Bengalis and Jummas. In 2012 the district administration in an official notice declared
that Bengalis and foreigners from outside the Hills would be barred from speaking to
Jummas without the presence of government officials - obviously there is an anxiety that
tourists speaking freely to Jumma might hear stories about land confiscation and
discrimination.
Methodology, Self-Reflection and Doing Politically Committed Research
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995) through her years of ethnographic research in
violent and politically volatile spaces argued that to conduct studies in such spaces one
cannot entirely distance herself from her research subject and is thus ethically obliged to
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take a “politically committed and morally engaged” stand. In the case of my research, my
first encounter with the situation in the Hills was as a journalist, transitioning to a
position as an activist, and finally a researcher. In a situation where a community of
people is minoritized and subjugated by the post-colonial state and faced with a history of
land loss through the acts of a powerful armed military under the guise of Bengali
nationalism, this position is even more important. In situations where there is war,
conflict or exercise of power to subjugate human lives Scheper-Hughes’ views are
critical, and contradict the idea of the traditional role of the anthropologist as neutral,
dispassionate, and objective. Speed (2008) also takes a similar stand to advocate for the
“transformation” of the discipline. Such an approach engages informants as
“collaborators” instead of “subjects”, but it also means that the work should be of
relevance to a broader audience, rather than published research that is meant to take up
space in one corner of a library.
As a member of the Bengali majority community I have opposed the use of power
of majoritarian politics to reduce Jummas to minoritized citizens of the country. Having
worked as an activist in the Hills, I have developed good working relations and
friendships with Jumma activists from different political groups, civil society
organizations, women rights groups and community leaders. Although my Bengali
identity makes me an ‘outsider’ in this struggle, my work as an activist has made me an
‘insider’. Hence my position as a researcher is one that Annie (2014) calls “not fixed but
multiple and shifting” (p. 59). Annie, like me, having previously worked with protest
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leaders for three years as a journalist and activist at a coal mine project in Bangladesh,
maintains that it is indeed possible for an anthropologist to be an ‘insider’ and keep one’s
distance. Ingold (2017) argues that it is important in anthropology to “study with people”
(p. 21) as opposed to making studies on them. Somewhat along the same vein Smith
(2017) emphasizes the importance of ‘unlearning’ in order for a researcher to position
herself as an ally “in the hope that my work can help prompt unlearning in a field full of
settlers” (p. 211).
The first time I visited Sajek in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh was in
February 2010. I was working as the coordinator of the International Chittagong Hill
Tracts Commission, an advocacy group when we received calls about tensions in the
area. The Bangladesh military had been building a road through the area that would meet
at the borders of India in Mizoram and had been bringing in Bengali workers from
outside to build the road. They were not only building the road but were also occupying
land and consolidating their share over the local bazaar. The conflicts over land and
bazaar share sparked off this attack.
When we started receiving calls we decided to take a group of journalists and
lawyers to assess the situation. On 19-20 February, two days after our four-person
delegation came back to Dhaka, the capital city, before we could finish writing up our
analysis, we were informed that nearly 400 homes of Jumma families in Sajek and
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Khagrachari had been burnt down by Bengali settlers, and two Jumma villagers had been
shot dead by military officers.
Six years later when I went to visit Sajek as part of my MA fieldwork in summer
of 2016, it had a completely different look. The Ruilui para village that is a long stretch
of road about 1km is the location for this new army-supported tourism project. The two
main military resorts were located on both ends of the road and in between there were
about 50 one-story and two-story buildings which were bed and breakfasts owned mostly
by Tripura inhabitants of the area. The tourists we came across were mostly young
Bengali professionals at the early stage of their career and accommodation cost between
Tk. 1500 ($24 CAD) and Tk. 3000 ($48 CAD) per night.
One has to cross military checkpoints at both Khagrachari and Rangamati districts
before entering Ruilui Para. Military vehicles escort tourist cars twice daily from
Baghaichari (Rangamati) to Ruilui Para; all tourists must register their names and travel
itinerary at the military checkpoint in Baghaichari prior to the escorted journey.
Between June and September 2016, I spent three months in Bangladesh to
conduct fieldwork for this research. During this time, I carried out 20 semi-structured
interviews with Jumma activists, development workers, scholars who have done research
on land-grabbing, Jumma lawyers, women’s rights activists, and others involved with
Jumma political parties. All those I interviewed were previously known to me. For my
data collection in the two hill districts of Khagrachari and Rangamati I conducted
18

participant observation, and in-depth and informal interviews. In some ways I have been
conducting participant observation, especially those related to military surveillance, from
my days working as a journalist and activist in the area, which was helpful in that I
already had a good basis for my research, even though this time my participantobservation had an academic focus.
My work as the former coordinator of CHT Commission turned out to be a
double-edged sword. The familiarity of the field and the local people made it relatively
easy to conduct the interviews without raising any concerns; however, my visit to the
field itself was difficult. Since 2011 the government took a hard line against journalists
and activists who advocated for rights of the Jummas following criticism of the military’s
human rights violations at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII).
That year, the CHT Commission had to curtail its fact-finding visit to the CHT following
disruptions by intelligence agencies during our meetings there.
I had visited many parts of the CHT between 2009 and 2014 while working as the
coordinator of the CHT Commission. During that time, I collected considerable
information and field notes. Conversations, observations and exchanges with activist
colleagues and informants, have shaped my thinking about the issues in this thesis.
Hence, I would say that the fieldwork for this work is not limited to the three months of
work that I did during my MA but builds on the experiences and knowledge I acquired
from 2009.
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I conducted interviews in Khagrachari, Rangamati, Chittagong and Dhaka all
depending on the convenience of my respondents. I deliberately avoided going to
Bandarban, where intelligence agents are known to be most active in their surveillance of
activists and journalists. In 2011 a British development worker, who was married to a
local Khyang woman, was expelled from Bangladesh for participating in a local activists’
rally in Bandarban. My inability to go to Bandarban is a setback for my work as state-led
tourism first began in Bandarban which is the most picturesque of the three districts and
some of the poorest Jumma people live in this area. It was also because of this I asked
two of my respondents to come to Chittagong to speak to me. Both of them worked on
land-grabbing by state forces in Bandarban. Ranglai Mro (one of the two respondents)
was brutally tortured by the military in 2008 for putting up a resistance on behalf of the
Mro people of Sualok Union, where he was headman at the time.
The day I arrived in Bangladesh, I went over to the CHT Commission office to
meet my former colleagues. June 12 was coming up in the calendar and this would be the
20th anniversary of the disappearance of Kalpana Chakma, a young, indigenous woman
activist who left some powerful words in her diary which were later published by Hill
Women’s Federation. My colleague at the CHT Commission secretariat, gave me further
updates about a meeting for the Commission members with the outgoing National Human
Rights Commission Chairperson. They had scheduled it for 10 June and asked me
whether I was interested in being present at the meeting. I agreed and said I would take
notes for the meeting.
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I also took part in several civil society-led movements. On June 30, on the
occasion of the 161st anniversary of the Santal Revolution (against the British) a civil
society group organized a discussion. On August 9, I attended the programs organized for
the UN International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. On August 10, I attended a
seminar organized by the Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD), a
Non-Government Organization (NGO) on land rights and prevention of terrorism.
Terrorism was of course a new addition to banners of both NGOs and political groups.
Three weeks after I arrived in Bangladesh a brutal attack took place by members of ISIS
in a restaurant in Dhaka City on July 1. It was the first such an attack in Bangladesh. The
security situation in the country changed overnight following that attack.
While I was there I also went to see an exhibition on the CHT at the DRIK
gallery. All the photos showcased the Hills as a tourist destination with beautiful
landscapes and exotic, indigenous people. On the 20th anniversary of the disappearance
of Kalpana Chakma there were a number of events organized by various groups in Dhaka
and Chittagong. I attended two related events in Dhaka - one organized by Hill Women's
Federation and another organized by a civil society group.
In the meantime, the Bangladesh Border Guards prevented Jummas from taking
part in a local union council election causing a ruling party leader to get elected. This
caused a lot of tension in the Hills while I was there. There were some attacks on Jumma
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neighborhoods as a result of that. A number of strikes were called by the Jumma activists
which had an impact on my travel as well.
Geros (2008) draws upon her ethnographic work to explore how the spread of fear
disseminated by the political structures affects not only the ways that social groups and
individuals experience and coped with the situation but also how such conditions affected
and constrained her own field research. It’s very important to acknowledge and discuss
these constraints at the outsets as it has implications for the outcome of the research and
also to understand the limitations of the research. In my case while my past work
experience led me to gain an understanding of the issue itself and gave me familiarity
with the area and the people, my work as an activist in the area imposed limitations on
my field research, especially in how much I could speak to the inhabitants or ordinary
people without getting anyone into trouble. The areas I visited are heavily monitored by
the security forces, especially those areas that are the subject of my research. In fact, I
was told by the local leaders there that I should not spend too much time in the Hills and
should only make short visits. Thus, I failed to talk to Jumma villagers to find out about
the consequences of military-based tourism on their everyday lives and to better
understand how they view and interpret the transformations resulting from tourism and
the effects of the violence. As a result, my interviews were limited to activists and other
researchers who have an understanding of the issue through their work, and as mentioned
earlier I drew on my own experiences as well.
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During my fieldwork, the Bangladesh Border Guards prevented Jummas from
taking part in a local union council election causing a ruling party leader to get elected.
This caused a lot of tension in the Hills while I was there. There were some attacks on
Jumma neighborhoods as a result of that. A number of strikes were called by the Jumma
activists which had an impact on my travel as well. The hartals also made it difficult to do
fieldwork. Although the main obstacle to do my fieldwork was my own previous identity
as coordinator of the CHT Commission, it would be equally dangerous for me to openly
do research on state violence on indigenous people. Research on violence on indigenous
people is strongly discouraged.
Research Questions
The study inquires into the steady and expanding incursion of the Bangladeshi state in
the Hills through tourism. More specifically, my research examines the implications of
military-controlled tourism on the power dynamics between the state and the Jummas,
Bengali hegemony and the paradox of tourism in a conflict area. It focuses on the
following areas:
▪

What does the involvement of the state in tourism imply for its national project
and what does it tell us about how state power is enacted and reproduced through
tourism?

▪

How does the state use tourism to control the indigenous population? To what
extent is the public aware of the military's economic interests in tourism? To what
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extent and how have these interests changed state strategies in dominating the
region?
▪

What role does tourism play in reinforcing administrative, social and political
hierarchies?

▪

How does the state manage the paradox of presenting indigenous peoples as a
distinctive population worthy of a tourist gaze, while simultaneously denying
them recognition in the constitution?

▪

How does the state justify the presence of the military in the field of tourism?
What do the current dynamics in the CHT between the various actors indicate on
a wider national scale?

Theoretical Framework and Concepts
Central to the argument of my thesis is the asymmetrical relations of power
between Bengali tourists and the Jumma destination residents, and how this power is
attained and enacted. My academic approach to power, and in particular relevant sections
that discuss colonial forms of knowledge and the power to represent draws on theorists of
power and post-colonial scholars. In the following sub-sections, I discuss concepts of
power and representation and how it applies to this case, mainly how the majority
Bengali exercises power over the Jummas. In addition, I discuss nationalism as an
imagined community, mobilized to exercise a majoritarian hegemony, violence, and fear
mongering. I discuss how leading scholars conceptualized the process of minoritization
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in post-colonial states in the South Asian context, and the political economy of tourism
and land expropriation
Power and representation.
Edward Said, the well-known literary critic observes that the historical experience
of those subjected to imperial rule entailed subservience and exclusion, and nationalist
resistance and decolonization aimed for liberation and inclusion. However, much of the
subsequent failings in the development of nationalism was “the direct result of either
forgetting or rejecting this edifying equation” (Said 2000: xxviii).
Indeed, many of the problems that afflict the countries that became nominally
independent from colonial powers may be attributed to the fact that they inherited
colonial institutions, political and social categories and classifications, and in turn
marginalized and oppressed other groups. Mamdani (2014) argues that the process of
state formation generates political identities that are distinct not only from market-based
identities but also from cultural identities.
Both Said (1979) and Stuart Hall (1997) were particularly interested in the power
of representation, meaning how dominant groups represent the ‘Other’. For Said, the
construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Orientalist literature became the working assumption
and where the ‘West’ and ‘East’ never meet as they are regarded as inherently
oppositional and unequal. The power to write about and speak about the ‘Other’ is clear
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in Bangladesh, and where the official national discourse has pervasive presence in public
space, especially through the mainstream media, although there are alternative and
oppositional sources that came about with social media. In the national discourse, and
more so in tourist brochures and advertisements, the Jumma are regarded as visible
cultural artefacts that fit appropriately with the pristine landscape.
Thus, the officials promoting tourism in the Hills promote the idea of the
unchanging native to lure tourists to gaze at the Jumma and other indigenous populations
as if they were on exhibition. Yet, they become immediately invisible politically, and the
suffering and ongoing struggle over land is all but completely absent and inaudible to
tourists. This is comparable to many similar processes in North America, Australia, and
on this particular topic, Mawani’s (2007) work on Vancouver Park is particularly
interesting. She argues that while state power has been used to colonize the northern
landscape, national narratives of legality and liberty are “deeply and problematically
rooted in ideas of a northern and empty wilderness” (p. 717).
In trying to understand the asymmetry between the state and the Jummas as it is
played out in the spatial politics in the Hills, it is important to analyze power within what
Foucault (2007) states is “the concrete and historical framework of its operation”. The
threatening power of the state is tangible in the Hills through the uniformed and armed
presence of the military. Foucault observed that power must be understood in “the
strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is
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embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social
hegemonies” (Foucault 2007). Disciplinary power, along with his idea of
governmentality, help to understand how the state uses power as a political strategy to
control a group of people. Disciplinary power is propagated through institutions and
establishments such as the military institution. Foucault’s concept of governmentality
also addresses those activities of government which include a methodical approach to
shaping a population’s behavior according to particular sets of norms to gain a certain
outcome. Anderson (1983) and Mamdani (2014) in explaining nationalism and collective
identity/memory writes on the processes of reproducing imagined communities.
Ultimately, the ruling elites in Bangladesh exploit Jummas, Bengali settlers who are
largely from poorer segments of society, as well as tourist groups in order to justify
dispossessing the Jummas from their land.
Said’s (1979) Orientalism was a critique of the assumptions that underpin
Western knowledge production, and the power of representation Orientalists have
wherein ‘we’ represents the West or the powerful subject of history, and the ‘other’ the
inferior object of history, assumed to be passive and unchanging. In a general sense, this
applies to how official and dominant national discourses may reproduce an internal
‘other’. In the case of the Hills the patronizing Bengali attitude towards Jumma
indigenous cultures is based on this distinction between ‘us’ Bengalis and ‘them’ the
internal others. Stereotyping Jummas as exotic, enigmatic and curious in terms of their
clothes, food habits, language and facial features makes it easy for Bengalis to see
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themselves as morally superior. This then justifies turning Jummas into an object for the
tourist gaze and this assumed superiority and constant ‘othering’ of the Jummas helps to
mobilize consent to keep Jummas under surveillance, to criminalize them, and thus gives
the state the moral authority to take over their land without compensation and with little
opposition from the Bengali population.
Hall (1997) argues that representation of the ‘different’ and the ‘Other’ is a form
of patronization and often hides a fascination in this ‘Otherness’. In popular culture,
representation of ‘Others’ deemed inferior fosters stereotyping and creates a spectacle of
the ‘Other’. The Jumma ‘spectacle’, however, erases the history of state oppression,
violence, land loss and the absence of rights. On the one hand, the state supports the
celebration of cultural festivals, beauty contests, food festivals, promotion of ethnic
tourism – all sponsored by corporations, the military and the state tourism board. On the
other hand, the Hills to this day remains the place where criminal government officers are
posted as punishment. Even newspapers lose their commercial revenue for identifying
them as ‘adibashi’ instead of ‘terrorists’. In addition to a discourse and publicly
orchestrated spectacle that endeavors to erases years of state-led oppression and
massacres in the Hills, the state also attempts to hide present-day oppression and
normalizes it for elite Bengalis who accept militarization and surveillance as an
acceptable part of keeping law and order. Both Hall (1997) and Fanon (2008) talks about
white obsession with sexuality of black people. This may also apply to disempowered
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and minoritized populations, especially where the physical appearance is significantly
different from that of the majority.
Nationalism, majoritarian hegemony, violence, fear and the state.
In this thesis, I also draw on Antonio Gramsci’s works, where he proposes that
state power weakens if it cannot mobilize popular support. Therefore, its hegemonic
power has to be reproduced shaping beliefs and attitudes that permeate everyday life in a
way that supports the structures of power. Hegemonic ideologies in time are internalized,
and become common sense among large segments of the population, they appear as
‘natural’. This is relevant to how the state reproduced a Bengali-Muslim identity as the
national core, which by definition excludes others that are neither Bengali nor Muslims,
or belong to one ut not the other. This demonization of the ‘others’ justifies surveillance
of the Jummas which it considers as threats to national stability, and as a suspect group
that is not entirely loyal to the nation-state. This attitude and repression of the Jumma led
to their marginalization. Gramsci’s work explains how the state through institutions in
civil society, such as educational and religious institutions help reproduce state ideology
and hegemony in a non-coercive manner, however, it also relies on coercive institutions,
the police and, military to impose its power violently and directly. His arguments about
how the ruling class exerts power over society is clearly evident in the case of the
Jumma, who are rendered exotic populations to be admired for the ‘primitive’ ways, but
also controlled violently if necessary for their resistance and assertion of land rights; in
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state propaganda, Jumma resistance is represented as a threat to state sovereignty and
national unity.
Chakma (2010a, 2010b), Mohsin (1997) and Adnan and Dastidar (2010) writes
about various aspects of violence in the CHT and Bengali nationalism, the topics vary
and include: land grabbing mechanisms and the interest groups involved, forced
displacement, violence against indigenous women, structural limitations on access to
justice, and state marginalization and post-colonial nation-state building. I build on the
existing body of this literature in order to inquire into the present-day paradox involved in
state-sponsored tourism and how this rearranges administrative, social and political
hierarchies, and the violence involved in such tourism.
Anthropologist Prashanta Tripura who grew up in Khagrachari in the Hills,
analyzes how the state defines Bangladesh as a homogenous Bengali nation with one
Bangla national culture (Tripura 2015). He points out that this ethnic and linguistic
hegemony is a colonialist notion inherited by the country’s Bengali elite. He shows how
'ethnicity' is politicized and socially constructed by dominant classes, to establish Bengali
ethnic hegemony leading to exclusionary politics. In a similar vein, Yasmin (2014) also
provides a critical study on cultural hegemony and the construction of the Bengali
national identity based on “positional dominance” (p. 129). Yasmin refers to the tyranny
of the majority as a “flawed conception” (p. 117) of post-colonial nationhood. As
Schendel (2001) observed, the issue of national identity is one of the most important and
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contested debates in the public domain since 1971 and notes that the term “Jumma” was
coined as a unifier to emphasize the “non-Bengaliness” and cultural separateness, and
shared history of marginalization and repression by the state. Like Schendel, Mohsin
(1997) too places liability of the disenfranchisement of the Jummas on the Bengali
political elite who sought to conceive the idea of the nation-state as based on the
understanding of homogeneous nationhood.
The imagined community, othering and political economy of tourism and
land expropriation.
According to Anderson (1983), nationalism is built on the idea of the “imagined
community” which he describes as a group of people who feel an affinity towards each
other despite being strangers. The commonness and affinity comes simply from being
born in the same geographical area defined under a ‘nation’. The implications of this
affinity in my research lies not in the cohesiveness of the community but the exclusion
created through this cohesiveness, in this case the Jummas who despite being part of the
Bangladeshi nation still are not part of the imagined Bengali community. In writing about
hegemonic nationalism Schendel (2001) points out that Bangladesh, like many other
post-colonial countries, fought against cultural pluralism by military rather than political
means which he points out is a continuation of the earlier colonial attempts at
homogenizing the population.
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Other scholars wrote critically about tourism and the tourist encounters, which is
useful to the Hills where tourism has been recently promoted and expanded. Salazar
(2017) for example, argues that although in popular perception, tourists are portrayed as
harmless and light-hearted figures and visitors, however, the systematic inequality
created through tourism erases the violence and power that are inherently present in
touristic encounters. On this particular topic, Salazar states: “The sheer force of enacted
tourism imaginaries can quickly dispossess people of their history, identity and culture”
(p. 705). Similarly, McLeod (2010) analyzes the struggle for control over different types
of natural resources and its relationship to power politics in tourism. Indeed, as
mentioned earlier, unresolved land issues have been a source of much of the conflict
between Bengalis and the Jummas, a state-constructed ‘ethnic conflict’. Paradoxically,
the state denies Jumma people the right to their ethnic identity, it nonetheless highlights
their cultural identity to develop tourism with a focus on their ethnic identity. As Holmes
(2010) suggests in the context of Belize, celebrating diversity in the tourist field and
denying it through the promotion of a singular national identity indicates the presence of
“unresolved tensions”.
Macleod and Carrier (2010) specifically discusses unequal power in interactions
between tourists and indigenous peoples. They point out that anthropologists are in the
best position to provide insights into tourism, power and culture for various reasons
including the specific method of involvement through participant observation and taking
the long-term view. Macleod identifies the power struggle over resources as a form of
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control of the nature and expansion of tourism. In fact, the global escalation of concern
for environmental impacts of tourism (and other economic activity) has not necessarily
limited this expansion.
Much of the violence in the CHT since the Peace Accord was signed is related to
land; it is considered one of the most contentious issues causing conflict between the state
and the Jummas. During the Jumma insurgency that started in the mid-1970s about
400,000 poor Bengalis were relocated to the hills under a military scheme (Arens &
Chakma 2002, D'Costa & Chakma 2008, CHT Commission, et. al.). These Bengalis were
provided with food rations and land titles and placed on land previously owned by
Jumma people mostly through customary forms of ownership. The program embroiled
poor, landless Bengalis in an armed conflict, where many lost their lives during armed
clashes. Adnan and Dastidar (2010) identify the forest department as the largest “land
grabber” in the CHT, followed by the security forces.
Minoritization, movements and the post-colonial state.
The processes whereby the state confiscates indigenous lands with dire
consequences on Jumma lives, is manifested at different levels. It is enabled by the
production of the Bengali-Muslim nationalist narrative that helps to mobilize consent
with the purpose of assimilating the Jumma as Bengali ‘others’. Scholars such as
Mahmoud Mamdani (2014) have been helpful in this regard, including his argument
about political identities in post-colonial countries. He proposes that many problems
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afflicting the post-colonial states are the consequence of how power is organized, and this
organizational and institutional structure is largely inherited from colonial powers. Along
with Mamdani, a number of other scholars inform my work including: Eqbal Ahmed
(1980) in his arguments about the relationship between the colonial state and power in
modern state formation; Nicholas Dirks (1992) who wrote about the reshaping of cultural
predicates and categories through colonial encounters; Bernard Cohn (1996) on colonial
forms of knowledge; Said’s work on the nexus of knowledge and power; and Partha
Chatterjee (1993) and his critique of nationalism. Many of these scholars argue that state
violence against minoritized groups and indigenous populations have their roots in
colonization. I contextualize the situation in the Hills through its colonial history and how
the traces of this history may be delineated in present day state ideologies and
institutions. Mahasweta Devi (1995) is particularly critical of colonization and Partition
which led formerly colonized countries of South Asia to exercise violence on
marginalized communities. Needless to say, the colonial legacy is only a partial
explanation, post-colonial critical thinkers Spivak (1999) and Fanon (2008) shed light on
the exploitation of subaltern groups in the ‘Third World’. Similarly, Urvashi Butalia
(2015), Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (2009) discuss how colonial violence based on
constructed differences was reproduced by post-colonial nation-states and critique the
legacy of colonialism within the framework of emerging globalization.
I then focus on state policies that dispossess and politically disenfranchise the
Jummas for the benefit of the corporate elite. Dirks and Tsing both argue that it is
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important to go beyond the general post-colonial critique to “break down the monolith of
colonialism”, (Dirks 1992) and to analyze nationalist ideologies and institutions “that
create the minority status” (Tsing 1993).
The colonial history of the Hills gives a profound insight into the deeply troubled
relationship between the Bangladeshi state and the Jumma peoples. The Hills were
formally annexed under British colonial territory in 1860. During this period the
Chakmas launched a resistance movement against the British (Qanungo 1998, Schendel
1992, Chowdhury 2016). Even after annexation the British granted the area an ‘excluded
status’ prohibiting access to it for Bengalis. While this move inadvertently protected the
Jumma peoples land from external incursions, the provisions of the exclusionary status
made it much simpler for the British to collect taxes from the Jumma people, but more
importantly it also became a source of resentment and ‘Othering’ of the Jummas.
Chapter Outlines
Chapter 1 of the thesis is an overview of my research including an outline of what
the research is about, its objectives, methodology used, and the theoretical sources I use
to structure my arguments. In Chapter 2, I look at how colonial histories and state
practices shaped the trajectory of violence, domination and marginalization of
minoritized, or politically subordinated, groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Looking at
studies carried out by post-colonial scholars I argue that British colonization and the
Partition of the Indian sub-continent are part of the historical legacy that has led to state
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repression fueled by ethnic and religious nationalism in this region. The post-1947
project of nation- and state-building led to the formation of highly centralized states to
prevent further secession but also led to violence fed by ideological nationalism.
Although the present conflict of the Jummas appears to be with the Bangladeshi state,
conflict with the state predates the formation of Bangladesh and has roots in colonization.
The violence related to state-controlled tourism in the Hills is one such case where the
Jumma indigenous people have found themselves at the receiving end of structural
violence by the state, a process that began long before Bangladesh became an
independent country, with its annexation into the British empire. In Chapter 3, I use my
fieldwork to explore how the state consolidates power through military-controlled
tourism in the Hills causing the Jummas to be further marginalized and dispossessed.
Militarization is a symbolic dominating tool that defines Bengali-Jumma relations,
constructs the idea of an ‘ethnic conflict’ and normalizes violence. Military presence has
very different meanings and consequences for the dominant Bengali tourists and the
subjugated local Jummas. In Chapter 4, I examine present-day tourism in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts and argue that it is underpinned with structural and symbolic violence that
expedites and expands a four-decade long colonization process by the ruling elite in
Bangladesh. I argue that the asymmetrical power relationship between Bengali tourists
and Jumma local residents has evolved through the history of this state expansion on
Jumma lands, reinforced by present-day violence and impunity, policies that encourage
exclusionary citizenship and the construction of ethnic hierarchy. In fact, the ethnicity of
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Jummas has become a tourist commodity, which conceals the structural inequalities
created by the nation-state between Jummas and Bengalis. I show how tourism in the
Hills embodies the socio-spatial politics and practices of state territorialisation where the
struggle over territory, identity and history plays out between the tourists and the locals.
Chapter 5, is the concluding chapter which will also give a glimpse of how I propose to
further my research in this field in my PhD work and in what specific ways advocacy and
research may be entwined in a positive and ethical way.
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Chapter 2: Violence, conflict and militarization in the Hills
The roots of much of the identity-based conflicts in South Asia including the violence in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts can be traced back to colonization and the subsequent Partition
of India in 1947. During two centuries of colonial rule over the sub-continent Britain
fomented communal cleavages, resulting in one of the most traumatic partitions in
history. Perhaps predictably, the massive population displacements following Partition
led to violence on a mass scale in large areas in the subcontinent, which often took the
form of identity-based conflicts. The repercussions of Partition and the violence it
fomented had an amplified effect on small ethnic and religious groups scattered all over
India and Pakistan. In Bangladesh, the dominant Bengali-Muslim national identity itself
is a post-colonial construct. It is against this identity construct that the Jumma indigenous
communities have found themselves a minoritized community struggling against the
state, for their land and cultural life. Drawing on fieldwork and many years of working in
the area as a human rights activist, as well as scholarly literature, including the work of
post-colonial scholars, I follow the political trajectory of the Chittagong Hill Tracts area
from when it was an independent area, through the Mughal period and colonial era, and
how it came under the administrative and military rule of Bangladesh. This overview is
important to explain the present exploitative nature of tourism in the region.
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The Roots of Violence in Post-Colonial Nation-States
In his work on knowledge and colonialism, Cohn (1996) argues that colonial
forms of knowledge enabled conquest as much as it was produced by it. Cohn discusses
the cultural effects of colonialism, and how British rule set in motion fundamental
cultural transformations. The colonial administration conducted censuses, registered
births, marriages and deaths, counted castes, tribes, religious groups and political
identities. Moreover, British colonial authorities classified people according to categories
based on their conceptions of the society they colonized. These were techniques that
buttressed control and domination of the sub-continent (Cohn 1996, Anderson 2003). As
an anthropologist and historian, Cohn was particularly critical of how colonizers used
knowledge produced about the ‘natives’ of the sub-continent to further their own
objectives and maintain their control. Thus, he draws attention to the importance of
historicizing anthropological findings from the field within the imperial context.
The categorization of populations by colonial powers along regional divisions
contributed to the shape of later schisms and violent conflicts in India, mainly, between
‘Muslim’ Pakistan and ‘Hindu’ India. Later, Pakistan was torn between East and West
Pakistan, and today this rupture bears on the relationship between the Bengali state and
the Jumma people of the Hills. Beginning with independence, the Bengali state
increasingly defined itself as a Bengali-Muslim nation. The merging of the categories
Bengali and Muslim and the institutional infrastructure of the state were established
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during colonial rule as explained earlier. In turn, Muslim-Bengali nationalism ‘Othered’
non-Bengalis and non-Muslims of Bangladesh, including the Jumma, which historically,
the British colonizers had segregated from the Bengalis. This social segregation planted
the seeds of distrust between the two communities. Constituting ten percent of the land
mass of the country, the independent state of Bangladesh was quick to prioritize a policy
of militarized control over Jumma territories. This control was largely achieved through
violence and a visible military presence in the three districts, which makes tourism such a
contested issue in the Hills.
Mamdani (2014) argues for exploring the relationship between history and
politics in the context of violence in order “…to problematize the relationship between
the historical legacy of colonialism and postcolonial politics” (p. 8). Although Mamdani
was explaining the Rwandan genocide and its regional context, and colonial roots in
Africa, his conceptual argument helps in explaining violence in South Asia. He writes
that perpetrators of violence construct and define the ‘enemy’ as against the self in terms
of religious, national, racial, or other categories. He argues that the horror of colonialism
led to “genocidal impulses” (p.9) which is particularly important to understand the cycle
of violence that continues in post-colonial nation-states.
As was the case with Pakistan and later Bangladesh centralization and
authoritarian rule, as well as militarization characterized much of their political histories.
In this context, Talbot and Singh (2009) observes that the post-1947 project of nation40

state building led to the formation of highly centralized states to prevent further
secession, however, it also led to violence fed by ideological nationalism. Das (1995)
looks further into post-Partition violence into how gendered political violence is and the
form of structural violence faced by people from certain geographical background faced
the violence more disproportionately. Although the present conflict in the Hills appears to
be about the Jumma struggle against the repression of the Bangladeshi state, as
Chowdhury (2017) explains the struggles waged by the Jumma predates the formation of
Bangladesh and goes back to their struggle against the British. Along similar lines, Guha
(1982) argues that the modern historiography of South Asia was dominated by two
elitisms – the colonialist and the nationalist.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts During the Mughal Era
It is believed to be in the 1400s that the first ‘tribes’ called the Kukis migrated to
the area from the Arakan region, now modern-day Myanmar, followed by Chakmas and
other communities in later centuries (Chowdhury 2016). Because the political boundaries
we have today were non-existent, migration and mobility across regions were fairly
spontaneous and unrestricted during this time (Chowdhury 2016). Before Mughal rule,
the Chittagong Hill Tracts was an unnamed territory and part of the hilly area between
the Lushai Hills of Mizoram in east India, and the Tripura state in northern India
(Schendel, Mey, & Dewan 2000). The District of Chittagong was on the West of the Hills
and Myanmar on the South, and emerged as a consequence of empire building and
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territorial spheres of influence. Schendel argues that the Chittagong Hill Tracts as a unit
is “a colonial administrative invention” (Dewan 2013).
By 1612 AD the Mughal state covered the area that is now Bangladesh except for
the city of Chittagong, which remained under the Arakanese and Portuguese until 1666
AD, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts which was under independent chiefdoms (Schendel
2009). Sometime during Mughal rule the Hills began to be referred to as the ‘Kapas
Mahal’, which means ‘Cotton Area’. During the 17th and 18th century, while the Mughals
never had direct rule of the region, they tried to strengthen their control over this frontier
region by promoting cultivation in the area, and by developing trade in cotton with the
Jummas. The battle of Polashi in 1757 was a major turning point in the history of South
Asia which led to the establishment of the British East India Company (henceforth the
Company), which marked the beginning of British Colonial rule over the Indian subcontinent. The Company’s main task was to collect revenues which helped to fund its
further expansion in the region, and it continued with the collection of revenue from the
Jummas after the defeat of the Mughals (Chowdhury 2016).
The Chittagong Hill Tracts During British Colonialism
The Chittagong Hill Tracts was so named in 1860 after it was formally annexed to
the Company. The British entry into the Hills was by collecting tax from the Jummas
through the authorities in Chittagong. The Jummas used to pay cotton tax to the Mughal
authorities and the Company essentially inherited this system after the Mughal empire
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was defeated. During Company rule the Hills were increasingly isolated from the rest of
Bengal. This demarcation of the Hills as a separate region protected it from outsiders who
did not habitually cultivate in hilly regions, it also allowed the British to exploit it by
collecting revenue from the Jumma peoples. The British colonial authorities created
administrative circles in the three districts: the Chakma Circle in Rangamati, the
Bohmong Circle in Bandarban, and the Mong Circle in Khagrachari. Furthermore, the
British created class hierarchies by co-opting the Jumma Circle Chiefs to make revenue
collection easier for themselves. Cooptation was a method used by colonial authorities,
represented by the Company, to try to contain a possible revolt originating from the
Chakma community in the Hills (Qanungo 1998).
The indigenous administrative structure of the Jummas is a three-tier leadership
system. The circle chief is also known as the Raja (king) and is the head of the
community of that circle. He is the main decision-maker of the community and certain
mauzas (i.e. groups of villages) are under his direct control. Headmen, or chiefs of
individual mauzas, are under the king in the indigenous administrative structure (Roy
2000). They also resolve disputes in these mauzas. Karbaris come under the headmen and
are the leaders of the villages.
The Company gave the Hill area an ‘excluded’ status, whereby it ensured that
Bengalis and Jummas did not develop a close relationship, with the exception of Bengali
migrants brought in to introduce sedentary cultivation to the Jummas. As mentioned
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earlier, the British rationale for setting up the administrative system under the circle
chiefs was an attempt to coopt the Jumma and ensure they will not oppose their policies.
However, they eventually took away the powers of the circle chiefs or the Rajas and the
headmen, which led to significant discontent among the Jumma elite. Chowdhury (2017)
argues that the Company’s objective for collecting revenue and separating communities
based on particular aspects of identity was not merely economic exploitation, but also to
establish their legitimacy in the region. The economic and historical ties between the port
city of Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts area led the British administration to
believe that this status quo needed to be maintained.
Moreover, the British colonial authorities placed large amounts of land under
direct control of the Forest Department, because they wanted to exploit the forest reserves
directly. They imported saplings from Burma and turned biodiverse forests into mono
plantations of teak. Teak had great commercial value, but it had negative effects on the
environment. In addition, they tried to prohibit plains people moving into the hills,
because they were traders and they feared the locals might become indebted to them and
thus cause complications in collecting taxes (Chowdhury 2016, Schendel, Mey, & Dewan
2000).
In May 1900, the CHT Manual (also known as the CHT Regulation or the CHT
1900 Act) was set up to exempt the circle chiefs and the Dewans (headmen) from paying
tax to the Company, and allow the Circle Chiefs the rights to timber plantation
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(Chowdhury 2016). This was a reward the British granted the Chiefs for collecting taxes
from the Jumma villagers, and was also as a way of attempting to buy their loyalty. The
Company clearly discouraged the Bengalis and Jummas from developing close social
relationships, and instead fostered divisions and animosity between them by privileging
one group or the other; eventually, this created hostility where one group saw the other as
more privileged. This was consistent with colonial policies, as the British followed a
divide and rule policy in Africa and elsewhere, keeping natives apart from one another in
order to prevent them from questioning the authority of the British, or unifying in a
rebellion against them. However, divisions continued after formal independence was
achieved in most of the previously colonized world. Chatterjee (1993) argues that in
contemporary post-colonial societies, the consolidation of power of the national states has
led to the markings of a new set of differences. He sees the contemporary battle of
subordinated groups as a continuity between colonial and postcolonial phases of the
imposition of the institutions of the modern states. He argues for the necessity of studying
the specific history of the colonial state, where the colonial representation of the other as
inferior and radically different, helps to understand the instances of this aspect in
relations between countries, nations and the normalizing of this othering in contemporary
states.
In 1935, the British declared the Hills to be a ‘Totally Excluded Area’ (Roy 2000,
Chowdhury 2014, Chowdhury 2016). On the one hand, the exclusionary strategy did
preserve the distinctive economy and ecology of the area, but on the other hand, it
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planted suspicion between the Jummas and the Bengalis. The 1900 Regulation Manual
allowed the Company to rule over the Hills with an entirely different set of rules and
regulations. As a result, it developed as a separate territorial and social unit from the
greater Bengal Province.
During British rule, the Hills were first regarded as a non-regulated area, then as
an excluded area, and then as a totally excluded area. This, Chowdhury points out,
“placed the Tracts at the periphery of Bengal politics” (Chowdhury 2016). The Hills had
no electoral representation in the Bengal legislature, so none of the concerns of the
Jummas ever became of concern for the Bengali political elite.
Fallout of Partition: The formation of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh
The role of the British in the Partition of India is well-known; however, its
repercussions continue to this day. When British colonialism came to an end, colonial
officials drew a line across the region along religious lines: Pakistan for the Muslims, and
India for the Hindus. They justified this sectarian division to the presumed irreconcilable
differences between the Hindu-dominated Congress, and the Muslim League, despite
centuries of coexistence in pre-colonial times. The Partition, however, also provided them
with an exit strategy whereby the political turmoil and human tragedy that followed such
an upheaval, would water down any attempts by the natives to hold the colonial power
accountable for the direct domination and exploitation of the region, and its people, and
any of its consequences. In fact, the constitution of the population inside the sub46

continent was much more complicated and reducing them to these two binary categories
was never really in the people’s favor. The British had collected quantitative data through
censuses during their rule, and colonial researchers had collected extensive qualitative
information about the people throughout the region. Ironically, the British were very
aware of the fallacy of this binary identity-based Partition. The fallout was predictable
and led to one of the largest human tragedies in the region. Mass displacements, riots,
massacres, and land grabbing devastated the region (Talbot & Singh 2009).
The Partition ran right through the Bengal region and Hindu-majority Bengal
became part of India while Muslim-dominated Bengal became part of Pakistan (East
Pakistan, present day Bangladesh). Partition led to the carving of the sub-continent and to
violence all over South Asia and beyond. It also led to strained relationship between India
and Pakistan and eventually Bangladesh. The tension between these three countries
continues to this day and the fact that Bangladesh and India share a border along the
Chittagong Hill Tracts meant that much of the tension between the Jumma people and the
state is influenced by India-Bangladesh relations. In fact, the CHT Accord between the
Jumma rebels and the Bangladesh government is said to have come about as a result of
India’s withdrawal of support of the Jummas (CHT Commission 2000).
Although the Partition was justified as a means to resolve conflicts, the Partition
of the sub-continent has in fact worsened the social schisms and fomented religious and
ethnic-led conflicts and violence that had not existed in these areas. In the immediate
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aftermath of Partition, 15 million people were displaced, between 200,000 according to
the British and 2million according to Indian estimate people were killed (Butalia 2000, p.
3), and at least 100,000 women were raped (Talbot and Singh 2009). Butalia, who herself
comes from a family of Partition refugees, has compiled stories of people “harking back
to an often-mythical past” where Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were part of the same
community with no traces of the differences brought about by Partition. In speaking
about post-Partition violence against Sikhs in India, she invokes Partition and her own
shock in how people from the same community “…could, once divided, do terrible things
to each other” (p. 5).
Moreover, not only are India, Bangladesh and Pakistan constantly negotiating or
competing for regional power and influence among them, but within each of these
countries, minoritized groups have had prolonged struggles with the state. It is possible to
suggest that the trauma of the Partition made the three states more distrustful of the
autonomy sought by indigenous populations. Although this question will not be dealt
with in this thesis, it is important to note, if briefly, that the ‘Othering’ of particular
populations within a country, or constructing other countries as enemies, such as India
versus Pakistan, or Bangladesh versus Pakistan plays a role in preserving the status quo
by redirecting economic inequalities, class conflicts, and political problems within these
states towards a constructed ‘enemy’. Identifying an ‘enemy’ of the nation helps states
and ruling elites in mobilizing people across classes against another group.
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The struggle by the people of Kashmir and the North East with the Indian state,
the status of the people of Balochistan in Pakistan and the struggle for self-determination
by the Jummas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are all instances of this homogenizing
attempts by the state, and a nationalist response which regards pluralism as a threat.
Violence and repression were and are still used by all these post-colonial states in dealing
with questions of land rights of the indigenous people. The fallacy that the British created
two homogenous nation-states based on religious affiliation was felt most violently in the
secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971. The cleavage between the two
started appearing very soon after Partition, when the Pakistani state declared that Urdu
would become the state language of Pakistan (Ali 2010). Consequently, the Bengalis of
East Pakistan resisted the assimilation attempt and the differences between these two
parts of the country along cultural, linguistic and geographical lines became. A protest by
university students on February 21, 1952 against the state’s decision was dealt with in a
heavy-handed manner and led to the killing of a number of students by the police (Ali
2010, p. 17). This day also marked the official beginning of the resistance movement of
the Bengalis – eventually an independence movement- against the Pakistan state where
the Bengalis emphasized language, culture and secular values to differentiate themselves
from the Pakistani-Muslim identity. Between March and December 1971, the Pakistan
military killed an estimated one to three million people, mostly Bengalis and according to
some accounts around 200,000 mostly Bengali women were raped by the military where
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many of them were also purposefully impregnated (Mookherjee 2006, D’Costa 2011,
Islam 2012).
Singh (2010) argues that freedom became elusive to different communities of
people in South Asia after Partition. Independence from British colonial rule, however,
did not end the oppression of minoritized communities like the Jummas. As Singh
(2010) points out, Partition increased the “minority complex amongst other ethnic groups
in the two states” (p. 11). Religion failed to work as a unifying factor for Pakistan, and
apart from the distance between East and West Pakistan, language and other
distinguishing factors were emphasized deepening the fissures between the dominating
West and subjugated East Pakistan. The war and the eventual formation of Bangladesh as
a sovereign nation-state exposed the flawed premises of Partition, which was especially
detrimental for the Jummas in East Pakistan as they were not Muslim and suddenly found
themselves part of Muslim Pakistan. The politics of Partition placed the Jumma under the
Pakistanis and then under Bengalis of Bangladesh, a state that similarly denied them
autonomous space. Thus, the original sin of Partition largely orchestrated by the British
denied the Jumma from determining their political identity.
The Bengal Boundary Commission, which was assigned to draw the border
between India and Pakistan was formed only six weeks before the British withdrew from
India. Although the main basis for the Partition was along ‘Muslims’ and ‘Non-Muslims’
lines, the Commission was also to take into consideration ‘other factors’ (Schendel 2004).
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Although the ‘other factors’ were vague, the deciding factor for placing the Hills under
Muslim Pakistan was its proximity to the important port city of Chittagong. In the
meantime, under the expressed premise of Partition, the Indian and Burmese flags were
raised in different parts of the Hills before the official announcements came from the
British colonial authorities (Schendel 2001). The flag incident was the first contribution
to the discourse of the Jummas as ‘traitors’ and has been used against the indigenous
people of the Hills ever since. Schendel (2004) identifies this incident and the subsequent
“doubts on allegiance” (p. 48) as having affected the Hills ‘most destructively’ and the
raising of the Indian flag as being the “core symbol of the district’s treason to the state of
Pakistan” (p. 48), an idea promoted in Pakistan’s nationalist discourse.
The perception of the Jummas as having allegiance to India explains why the
Pakistan government did not consult with them regarding damaging “development”
projects in the Hills, particularly the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam. In
1961 the Pakistan Government, with financial sponsorship from the United State Agency
for International Development (USAID), completed the construction of the dam over the
Karnaphuli River in the Rangamati district. The dam submerged 40 percent of the
cultivable land (54000 acres) of the district and displaced nearly 100,000 mostly
Chakmas, turning them into environmental refugees. There was very little compensation
provided to the people and some 40,000 Chakmas migrated as asylum-seekers to the area
that later became known as Arunachal Pradesh in India in 1964 (Singh 2010).
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The independence of Bangladesh should have provided some relief for the
Jummas as the new nation-state defined itself as secular in its constitution, but the Jumma
soon realized their political rights and rights to autonomy was under threat. Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, who led the independence movement for Bangladesh and became the
first president was an ardent Bengali nationalist, and Jummas had no separate political or
cultural space in the state’s national project. In fact, the idea that the Jumma’s are
disloyal and treacherous remains deeply ingrained in the public national discourse about
them.
During Bangladesh’s movement for independence most Jummas remained neutral
as there was no natural affiliation for either the Pakistan state (led by a nationalism
underpinned by political Islam) or the Bangladeshi state (led by Bengali nationalism).
Further, the Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy received a political position in the Pakistan
government. After Bangladesh’s independence, the Chakma Raja settled down in
Pakistan permanently and never returned to his home land. This led to a Bengali
nationalist resentment towards the Chakma Raja. Violence erupted in the Hills among the
Bengalis in 2012 following his death in Pakistan when the news spread that his ashes
would be brought to his hometown of Rangmati (Daily JaiJaiDin 2012). This eventually
never materialized. Further to this, in May 2017, the High Court in Bangladesh passed a
judgment that the name of Chakma Raja Tridev Roy would be removed from all public
installations, following a writ petition by two individuals from Rangamati. Clearly this
was more of a symbolic value than anything else.
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The post-1947 project had created centralized states, one of the main reasons
being to prevent further secessions. In discussing the centralization of power in postcolonial states, Ahmed (1980) argues that in the effort to create modern states these
countries developed a military bureaucratic superstructure of power on an
underdeveloped infrastructure of participation. He points out that these states exert power
through coercive means and systematic violations of human rights, which is a very
common aspect of such systems. Post-1947 state building underpinned by nationalist
ideologies, led states to develop assimilationist policies to exert power over minorities.
These policies then became points of discontent for minoritized groups and led to armed
movements for self-determination. The formation of Bangladesh as an independent
country was one such case. Talbot and Singh (2009) have pointed out that although the
Partition was a divide along religious lines, ethnic consolidation of different groups and
communities were also furthered through this divide.
Colonial Roots of Representation of the Jummas as the Exotic Native
Between 1795-1815 AD, Francis Buchanan visited different parts of Bengal and
carried out surveys which are one of the first known surveys of the area. However,
Buchanan’s accounts of the southeastern region collected in 1798, which includes the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, was not discovered and published until 200 years later by
Schendel. Buchanan spent two and a half months traveling through Chittagong, the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Tripura, Arakan, Manipur, Mizoram and Burma beginning in
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March 1798. Although the main objective of Buchanan’s visit was to find out whether
spice could be profitably produced in the hilly region, he also wrote down extensive
details about the social life of the people in the areas he visited. Buchanan, who is
believed to be the first traveler who has left written accounts of the Hill area, documented
his observations before the Hills became formally annexed to the British empire. This
may have played an important role in facilitating the formal annexation some 60 years
following the visit. Although Buchanan was critical of some of British policies in the
sub-continent, there is little doubt that he supported the colonization process in principle
and his documentation was crucial in the Company’s expansion in the region. Schendel
(1992) points out that Buchanan’s manuscript is illustrative of “the ‘ethnocentric’ views
held by ‘enlightened’ Europeans at the time” and that “all European sources on early
colonial Asia suffer from similar prejudices, blind spots and distortions” (p. xix).
There is very little visual representation of the Jumma people during British
colonial times, and as Schendel (2002) noted this is due to the fact that there was very
little interest in the area by anthropologists, archaeologists and tourists at the time.
However, a number of British and German photographers have done visual work on the
Mro, Lushai, Khumi and the Pankhowa people, which say something about who these
groups are. The colonial documenters were especially fascinated with the nudity of the
Mro communities, evidenced by many photos featuring bare-breasted women and men
with loin cloths. This was a way to demonstrate their primitiveness and it fit in perfectly
with the label of the ‘native’. Most of the photos also show that they were posed for the
54

occasion and were not taken during their ordinary daily activities. Schendel (2002) points
this out in how they “had to prepare them for the Western scientific eye by having them
almost undress, lined up in an orderly manner and deprived of any social context” (p.
346).
The above-mentioned construction of an inferior and exotic ‘Other’ invokes
Said’s (1979) critique of Western approaches to intellectual inquiry of the ‘Oriental’ by
illustrating how Western scholars especially in the 19th century, produce patronizing
representations of the East. His criticism of such representations was that the body of
knowledge produced by Western scholars presupposes an essential difference between
East and West, and in which the West is the superior subject of history, and the ‘East’ its
inferior object of history and study. These representations are used alongside or
accompany political, economic and military domination. Similarly, Cohn (1996) argued
that colonial forms of knowledge production in the context of the Indian sub-continent,
reinforce British superiority and the construction of the native indigenous other, as one
with static cultural and racial essences. Present-day Bengali tourists are in fact also
reproducing this colonial, orientalist gaze, enabled by a tourist industry controlled by the
state primarily through its military forces.
History of the Military in Bangladesh
The Bangladesh military was formed after the country’s independence from
Pakistan in 1971. Many of the officers in the newly independent country’s military were
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members of the Pakistan military along with those who were members of Mukti Bahini
(Freedom Fighters), who fought in the war against Pakistan. Approximately 28,000 of the
36,000 military officers in the Bangladesh army were repatriated soldiers from the
Pakistan army (Bhattacharjee 2010, p. 3). The repatriated soldiers in 1973 may have
some significance over the modeling of the military after that of the Pakistan Army.
Following independence, the Awami League government received support from
India as it was seen as a secular political group. Sheikh Mujib, the leader of Awami
League, came to be known as the Father of the Nation. He became authoritarian and
prohibited representation of other political groups in the national government. He
justified his authoritarian style by posing as the guardian of unity and arguing it was
necessary to prevent further disintegration of the country.
In the newly formed state a lot of the important positions in the military remained
vacant for a while. The first national election in an independent Bangladesh was held in
1973. Islamist groups, who were perceived as pro-Pakistan were banned from
participating in the election, but there were many left-leaning political groups who were
very unhappy with Sheikh Mujib’s authoritarian leadership. However, in the election,
amidst wide allegations of vote rigging the Awami League declared that they had
collected 97 percent of the seats in parliament. In December 1974 Mujib who was
increasingly losing his popularity, declared a state of emergency, introduced a single-
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party presidential system, declared himself to be the new all-powerful head of state, and
eventually removed all democratic rights of the people (Riaz 2016).
It was during this political crisis that the Bangladesh military first entered the
political arena and the public got a preview of things to come in the future. The 55,000strong Bangladesh military was composed of Pakistan era professional soldiers – some of
whom had joined as freedom fighters in the war against Pakistan while many of them
were stranded in prison camps in West Pakistan during the war. In post-independence
Bangladesh, however, there were several reasons why the Bangladesh military soldiers
became disgruntled: firstly, because they believed that the glory of their victory was
taken away from them by the Indian government, secondly because of the formation of a
parallel force by Mujib under the name of Rokkhi Bahini, and thirdly because of Mujib’s
closeness to India (Schendel 2009). There was also dissatisfaction over the decrease in
resource allocation and personal rivalries within the military between those who
participated in the war of Independence for Bangladesh and those who were repatriated
from West Pakistan in 1973 (Riaz 2016). On 15 August 1975, the military assassinated
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and more than 40 members of his family and household staff at
his own home. His daughter, Sheikh Rehana and Sheikh Hasina, the present Prime
Minister of the country, were in Europe at the time. The coup was engineered by 30
junior military officers (Riaz 2016, p. 59).
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This turned into a political crisis of proportions that the new nation was not
prepared to handle, and military dictatorship became the modus operandi for governance.
Initially the military installed Khandaker Mushtaq Ahmed, a minister under Mujib as the
President of the country with other Awami League leaders as cabinet members. There
was uncertainty following the killing of Sheikh Mujib and the power struggle between
various military officers and political leaders within the Awami League clearly
demonstrated that no one was in control of the country’s leadership. Several coups and
attempted coups were carried out by the military during this time. One such coup led
military officers to assassinate four prominent Awami League leaders inside a prison.
These four Awami League leaders were close to Sheikh Mujib and jailed by the military
following his assassination. A soldiers’ mutiny on 7 November 1975 saw the killing of
around 33 officers and 100 enlisted men. It is believed to be one of the largest mutinies
since the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 (Riaz 2016). Through this political chaos, coups and
counter-coups General Ziaur Rahman installed himself as a commander in 1975 and in
1977 officially became the new president of the country.
Ziaur Rahman immediately raised the defense budget of the country from 7
percent to 20 percent. It also took up an economic policy of de-nationalisation and by
1982 a total of 236 industrial units were denationalized (Riaz 2016). Political power
wrangling within the military itself continued throughout Zia’s term. In October 1977
another, and to date the most violent, coup was carried out by the military where more
than 200 soldiers, army officers and air force officers were killed in an otherwise failed
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attempt to topple Zia’s military leadership. However, President Zia was subsequently
assassinated in yet another military coup in 1981 and the country quickly went under a
state of emergency.
Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975 the country went under 15
years of de facto military rule first with General Ziaur Rahman as the president from
1975-81, and then by General Hussain Muhammad Ershad from 1982-90. Ershad also
took power of the country through a coup but during his eight-year dictatorship,
Bangladesh Awami League (founded by Sheikh Mujib and then led by one his surviving
daughters Sheikh Hasina), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (founded by Ziaur Rahmana and
then led by his widow Khaleda Zia) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the Islamic political party
formed by those who opposed the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan) led a
movement to restore democracy in the country (Ali 2010). Sheikh Hasina, Mujib’s
daughter, who had been abroad since before her father’s death, came back to Bangladesh
in 1981 and took part in the election as which was widely publicized as a return to
democracy. The two military dictatorships were repressive, limited democratic rights of
the people and contributed to the manipulation of the constitutional process (Riaz 2016).
A military-led government returned in 2007 in the form of military-backed
caretaker government when the country’s two main political groups, the Awami League
and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party went head to head against each other prior to a
nationwide general election. Confronted with a lack of consensus over election rules and
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regulations and increased violence across the country the military took over, and stayed
in power behind a caretaker government for nearly two years. Hundreds of people were
killed in the violence of the two political parties. The military officially took over on
January 11 of 2007 and promised to solve the political stalemate. Initially there was
widespread support for the military intervention as the general people were getting
infuriated with the daily political violence. Soon however it seemed the military had
greater political ambitions than was initially perceived. The caretaker government filed
corruption cases against the top leaders of both the political parties, murder cases against
Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, physical presence of the military started increasing in the
public spaces and the media were forced to publish the official version of the new
provided by the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the military
intelligence section of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. It almost began to replicate the
CHT situation for the rest of the country.
In February 2009, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), a paramilitary force, carried out
one of the bloodiest military coups since the restoration of democracy. The BDR’s
mandate is mainly to guard the country’s borders and to assist the military during state
emergencies. A total of 74 people, including 57 top level army officers were killed in the
mutiny (Rabbi 2017). Hundreds of BDR officers were sentenced to death in mass trials
which were termed ‘unfair’ by independent observers. Since the institution’s reputation
became ‘tainted’ by this mutiny, the BDR was subsequently renamed Border Guards
Bangladesh (BGB). This incident revealed the deep division that had developed between
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upper and lower ranking officers over financial advantages that the military was enjoying
over the border guards.
The BDR headquarters is situated in the heart of Dhaka’s residential area in
Dhanmondi. The Rifles School and the residences of the families of those who work for
the BDR are also inside this heavily guarded area. In fact, many of the armed forces
establishments are housed within residential neighborhoods. The Dhaka Cantonment is
also situated in the heart of the most densely populated city in the world and public
vehicles are not allowed to ply through it. This adds to the congested traffic situation on
all sides of the little bubble, but families of the military officers live unperturbed by the
traffic situation that is created because of their enclosed and privileged community life.
Dhaka is currently the most densely populated city in the world and considering that 16
million people live inside Dhaka City, an area that does not exceed 10,000 people per
square kilometer, one can imagine the power, prestige and impunity that the military
institution enjoys. There are checkpoints at the entrances of both the BDR Headquarters
and the Dhaka Cantonment which are controlled by armed guards, who prohibit civilians
from entering without a valid reason. The appearance of both these areas loom in stark
contrast to the rest of the city. The cantonments are clean, orderly and organized, and the
atmosphere is enhanced with lush greenery. In contrast, the rest of the city is a scene of
chaos where people travel along dangerous roads to get from one part of the city to
another in traffic jams, and where the sight of greenery is becoming increasingly rare. As
of 2011, the Bangladesh Armed Forces had approximately 220,950 serving personnel.
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The military has been directly or indirectly involved with the country’s political life
throughout its 46-year history. There have been periods of military rule, several coups,
mutinies and attempted coups. Even when the military is not directly running the
government, they are known to exert considerable authority over the civilian government
regarding important political decisions regardless of which political party is in power.
The Characterization of the Bangladesh Military as ‘Bengali-Muslim’
Nearly 90 percent of the present population of Bangladesh are Muslims (BBS),
but political Islam is a fairly new construct. It was the military leaders who scrapped
secularism and introduced Islam as the state religion in the constitution and made it
permissible for Islamic political groups to take part in the elections. The country’s
independence architect and first leader Sheikh Mujib was very determined to distance the
new nation of Bangladesh from its earlier Muslim representation under Pakistan. Thus,
when the country’s first constitution was crafted, ‘secularism’ was one of the founding
pillars of the constitution along with ‘socialism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘nationalism’. It was
the military dictator Ziaur Rahman who removed ‘secularism’ from the constitution in
1977 and replaced it with: “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah”, and declared that
Islam would be the state religion. In the 15th amendment to the constitution in 2011 the
Bangladesh Supreme Court restored secularism in the constitution but retained Islam as
the state religion.
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The military ruler Ziaur Rahman also rescinded a constitutional provision
prohibiting religion-based parties from participating in national elections (Riaz & Raji
2011). Following the military coup Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and the
military declared Bangladesh to be an Islamic state (Riaz 2016). As Karim (1998)
observed, by bringing the phrase Bismillah ir rahman ir rahim (in the name of Allah, the
glorious and the all merciful) at the beginning of all state functions, including statecontrolled media, the nation reifies the Bangladeshi citizen and state as Muslim. This
marginalizes the indigenous communities in Bangladesh who live on the margins of the
state.
The two consecutive military-led dictatorships were pivotal in bringing religion
into the political arena (Riaz 2016). Although Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League was
initially adamant about keeping religion out of politics, by the time Sheikh Hasina came
to power, the party could no longer go back to those secular ideals and in fact has
repeatedly and openly tried to appeal to the Islamic political groups in formulating
national policies. The other main political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),
whose leader is the widow of the former military dictator, has a formal coalition with
Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamic political group many of whose members were
sympathetic towards a unified Muslim-Pakistan. Since 1970 the number of Islamist
parties have risen from 11 to 100 in 2006 (Riaz & Raji 2011). Through the efforts of the
military leaders the influence of political Islam on Bangladesh’s cultural, social and
political life has been on the rise. This emerging political setting combined with
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increasing poverty rates, youth unemployment and a regional influence (mainly from
Gulf oligarchies) makes for a fertile ground for nurturing Islamist politics, some of which
has led to violence.
Although the 1971 war of independence was fought on the basis of Bengali
nationalism and there were active efforts from within the leadership to include Bengalis
of all religions in the movement, in independent Bangladesh and with military
involvement in politics, a chauvinistic nationalism emerged. Soon the ‘nation’ was
represented as Bengali-Muslim whereby Hindus, Christians, Buddhists and others
became the national ‘Other’. In this national project the Jummas were further
marginalized. The issue of national identity, in fact, is a topic of very heated discussions
in national politics, and where ethnicity, religion and sovereignty are key concepts
debated in these discussions (Schendel 2001). Political Islam by definition privileges
religious nationalism and its adherents see the Muslim-Bengali identity as the ‘authentic’
national identity. The military establishment in general, and the military rulers in
particular, have used religious nationalism to manipulate people’s sentiments in their
pursuit for power, as well as maintaining their overwhelming presence in the Hills.
Although there is resistance to it from within civil society, political Islam has come to
play a considerable role in the national life of Bangladesh, its adherents at different times
and to differing degrees may influence national policies related to women’s status,
unleash terror threats on cultural activities deemed ‘secular’, repress freedom of speech,
and unleash hate speech on religious minorities. There has also been a rise of religious
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nationalism in Bangladesh, an ideology that emerged following the failure of independent
post-colonial nation-state to deliver on its promises of freedom and economic
prosperities. These groups are a regional phenomenon, and influenced by the rise of
armed groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in the Middle East, known by its
acronym ISIS, and who use “Islam” in their name to grant themselves a puritan religious
aura and justify their criminality.
Islamization has been one of the state policy for occupation of the Hills. Chakma
and Hill (2013) note that from 1982 to 2001 the number of mosques in the Hills increased
over four-fold and madrasas [religious schools] over forty-four-fold. The Saudi-owned
NGOs’ presence is said to be influential in Islamization (CHT Commission 1991). A
number of Tripura children have been taken away from their families to madrasahs
outside the CHT. Many of the children are abducted by the madrasahs but many are
simply bought off with the support of Islamic NGOs (Kapaeeng Foundation 2013, p.
192). In some of these cases, the families of the Jumma children are too poor to put up a
resistance. Jumma communities have also been targeted for proselytization by Christian
missionaries from long before (Islam 2013). Lushai communities have almost entirely
become Christian as a result. However, the targeting for Islamization has been part of
state’s strategy of occupation, land acquisition and to suppress the Jumma people’s fight
for self-determination. For example, when changing the Jumma names of neighborhoods
in the Hills the state has followed a Muslim naming procedure. Some places have simply
been renamed Muslim para or Islam para from their former Jumma names. The state
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possibly perceived that people would follow more caution in resisting Islamic naming
rather than to Bengali naming.
The Bangladesh Military’s Corporate Interests
The military in Bangladesh, as in many other countries, is an important part of the
state machinery and its function is not restricted to the defence of the state and its
citizens. The Bangladesh military dominates other state institutions and has played a big
role in the political history of the country. It has been directly involved with
infrastructure development and has considerable commercial ventures across the country.
The Bangladesh military is a very powerful and politically influential body in
Bangladesh (Bhattacharjee 2010). It has many profit-making endeavors under its welfare
trust, the Sena Kalyan Sangstha. It owns one of the biggest 5-star hotels in the country
(The Radisson), it owns flour mills, ice-cream factories, food industries, real estate,
infrastructure projects etc. Moreover, the military’s corporate interests are not included in
the formal defence budget of the country. In fact, the corporate military is completely
outside this structure. This income is not only over and above their formal income, but
also helps them to form another layer of control over civilian population.
UN agencies have a strong presence in occupied and conflict-ridden areas around
the world. Bangladesh is one of the largest troops contributing country in the world and
for military officers it is a big source of income and pride (Haque 2012, 29 May). In 2011
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the Bangladesh government responded harshly to a report by a UN special rapporteur for
questioning the human rights record of the military in the Hills (CHT Commission 2011,
July 12). Since 2000, there has been an increase of 280 percent troop contribution to the
UN peacekeeping operations and army officers from Bangladesh make up 93 percent of
the UN Peacekeepers (Zaman and Biswas 2012).
In her research of the Pakistan army’s corporate interests, Siddiqa (2010) coins
the term ‘milbus’ to describe what she says is the “peculiar kind of military capital” (p. 1)
that drives the political ambitions of the armed forces. The Bangladesh military, because
of its historical connections with the Pakistan military, styles its corporate interests after
them too. It is particularly important to study the military’s business interests as its
financial transactions are not subjected to any public scrutiny and largely remain outside
the jurisdiction of the civilian government (Chatterjee 2010).
The military’s business interests and its political influence over national policies
are inseparable. The authoritarian nature of the institution helps it to maintain lack of
transparency over its businesses and gives it unparalleled power over the civilian
government and society. Many in Bangladeshi media and outside observers speculate that
Awami League came to power in 2009 because it had an understanding with the military
(Chaudhury 2012). Chatterjee’s (2010) study of the Bangladesh military’s business
interest has a noticeable absence of these interests or the military occupation in the Hills.
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Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A National Project
Unlike the rest of the country the military in the Hills work under a specific and
confidential directive known as Operation Uttoron (Upliftment) which was enforced by
the Government of Bangladesh in 2001 to replace the earlier Operation Dabanol
(Wildfire), which was in operation through an order by the military dictator Hussain
Mohammad Ershad during the period of the armed conflict which gave authority to the
military officials to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Hills. Operation Uttoron
is believed to have the same authority as Operation Dabanol (IWGIA 2012, p. 10).
Ever since Bangladesh’s independence, and the Jumma people’s movement for
self-determination, the Hills and the Jummas of the Hills have been placed under this
national security discourse and have become the nation’s other. Policies and actions
related to the Hills are subject to approval by the military and not merely a matter of the
civilian government. In fact, military officers are always present in civil society meetings
and gatherings.
In 1972 the Jumma people formed the Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s
Party or the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samily (PCJSS) to fight against the
Bangladeshi state’s repressive policies and attempt to assimilate the Jumma people. After
the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, military dictator Ziaur Rahman looked for a
brutal military solution to the Jumma people’s claims. This led to full-fledged armed
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conflict between the military and Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), the armed wing of the
PCJSS.
The PCJSS points out: “In place of ensuring the special administrative system
with the CHT Regional Council and three Hill District Councils, while maintaining ‘de
facto’ military rule and supremacy of the army in the name of ‘Operation Uttoron’, these
Councils have been made totally dysfunctional” (PCJSS, E-newsletter, Nov 30, 2016).
Just as the Pakistani state denied the regional autonomy demanded by East Pakistan, in
independent Bangladesh the Bengali state refused autonomy to the Jumma people of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. This resulted in discontent among the Jumma population who felt
politically and economically marginalized in post-independence Bangladesh and its focus
on Bengali-Muslim nationalism. And just like West Pakistan tried to quash this
movement for self-determination through military means, the Bangladeshi state sent the
military off to the Hills to tame the Jumma people’s movement through repressive means.
In February 1972 Manabendra Narayan Larma (Chakma Member of Parliament)
went to Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to seek autonomy for the
Hills. Rahman turned down Larma’s request saying that there could only be one nation in
Bangladesh and asked the Jummas to “become Bengali”. He further threatened to send
Bengalis into the CHT so that Jummas would become minorities there (Mohsin 1997).
This hostile response from the founding leader of the country, and the person who led the
movement for self-determination of the Bengali people, resulted in the indigenous Jumma
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people of Hills to take up an armed struggle for autonomy. Anderson (2003) argues that
the nationalist post-colonial states often became authoritarian in nature and the colonial
policy of minoritization continued with a national policy of homogenization.
In 1976 General Ziaur Rahman, the military dictator, formed the Chittagong Hill
Tracts Development Board and appointed the Area Commander of Chittagong
Cantonment as Chairman (Faiz and Mohaiemen 2010). The Shanti Bahini (Peace Forces)
was formed soon after that and led the armed struggle for self-determination until
December 1997. In May 1977, in response to an attack on the military by the Shanti
Bahini, the military deployed additional armed forces to the area until there was one
soldier for every five Hill residents (Faiz & Mohaiemen, 2010).
Over the three decades of armed struggle the Bangladesh military set up six
military garrisons in the three hill districts of the CHT and more than 500 military camps.
According to Roy (2001) there was anywhere between 35,000 and 114,500 military
personnel posted in the CHT in 2001, after the Accord had been signed. One-third of the
entire Bangladesh army was deployed in the CHT at that time and the number of
indigenous people in the area was about 600,000 (Roy, 2001). During the armed conflict,
the military also brought in 400,000 poor and landless Bengalis from the plainlands of
Bangladesh and gave them land titles and food rations (Arens & Chakma 2002, D'Costa
& Chakma 2008, CHT Commission, et. al.). The settlers however did not realize that the
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they were brought in as human shields for the military there. Hundreds of settlers were
also killed during the armed conflict by Shanti Bahini (Hazarika 1989, June 11).
During the period of the armed struggle the Bangladesh military carried out at
least 11 mass killings in the Hills, in most of the cases, there is no record of the number
of people who were killed (Table 1). One such massacre was carried out in Kalampati
(Kaokhali) in Rangamati Hill District. It is said that the local army commander invited
Jummas of the area to a meeting at a Buddhist temple and ordered officers to open fire on
the gathering which killed between 200-300 people (Roy 2000). This led Bengali settlers
in the area to carry out a further attack on Buddhist temples and Chakma homes in the
area. A number of indigenous women were raped during the military operation of the
1980s and 1990s. During this period there were a number of retaliatory attacks by Shanti
Bahini on Bengali settlers which led to counter-retaliatory attacks by settlers and the
army on the Jummas continue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In December 1980 the
military government passed the Disturbed Area Bill, giving Chittagong Police SubInspector and any Non-Commissioned Army Officers the right to shoot individuals
suspected of illegal activities, and the right to raid any home suspected of storing
weapons (Faiz and Mohaiemen 2010). The targeted massacres and mass rapes carried out
by the Bangladeshi military in the Hills have not been acknowledged by the Government
of Bangladesh. Amnesty International (1986), Survival International, the CHT
Commission (1991, 1994, 1997, 2001) and Anti-Slavery Society (1994) are some of the
international human rights organizations who have reported about these cases.
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Table 1: A list of the massacres carried out by the military in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. (Source: Bhumitra
Chakma, University of Hull).

The military has a very strong presence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In addition
to the military, 10,000 personnel from the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), along with
another 10,000 Ansar and Armed Police Battalions (APBn) personnel are also deployed
in the area, making a total of 50,000-60,000 armed personnel stationed in the CHT
(IWGIA 2012). In addition, the Village Defense Party (VDP), a voluntary paramilitary
force organized under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is recruited largely from Bengali
villagers and trained by the police. The total number of VDP members in Bangladesh is
approx. 5.6 million.
In addition to the violence, 400,000 Bengali settlers were strategically placed in
cluster villages near the army barracks to serve as human shields (Arens & Chakma 2002,
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D'Costa & Chakma 2008, CHT Commission, et. al.). This change the demography of the
Hills very rapidly. In 1947 Jummas made up 98 per cent of the population in the Hills, by
1991 this figure dropped to 51 per cent (Mohsin 1997). Occupiers make deliberate efforts
to alter the demographic features of the occupied territory either by deportation and
expulsion of those occupied or through population transfer from the ranks of the occupier
(Falk 2013). Although the rebels conceded defeat in 1997 the military never left the
region in accordance with the ‘Peace’ Accord that was signed between the rebels and the
government. To this day one-third of the entire Bangladesh military personnel are
deployed in the CHT with a ratio of one soldier per 40 civilians (IWGIA, 2012).
Since the signing of the 1997 CHT Accord a number of interest groups have
formed in the Hills, including a division within the Jumma people’s movement. A
number of Jummas opposed the signing of the Accord and they later went and formed the
United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) in 1998 with its own student wing and
women’s wing. Somo Odhikar Andolon (Equal Rights Movement) was formed with the
strong support of Bangladesh Nationalist Party but now has support from all national
political parties who receive funds from the military’s pacification program and are
primarily responsible for organizing attacks on Jumma people (IWGIA 2012). In 2007 a
number of leaders from PCJSS broke away from the main party and formed the PCJSS
(Reformist). Apart from arson attacks on common Jumma peoples, there have been a lot
of violence among these groups over the years and have added to the overall volatile
situation in the Hills. The UNDP has a sizable project, the Chittagong Hill Tracts
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Development Facility (CHTDF) in the region and works with the government, the
military as well as the Regional Council and Hill Districts Council, but there is very little
independent assessment of their role.
After Bangladesh became an independent country there was fear among the ruling
elite of a further identity-based secessionist movement within Bangladesh as there had
been growing disenfranchisement among the Jummas during the East Pakistan period,
coupled with the Chakma Raja’s cooperation with West Pakistan. When the first
constitution of the country was being formulated the Jummas approached the new Prime
Minister to discuss the future of the CHT with the goal that it should be an autonomous
area within the state and that there should be constitutional safeguards for the Jummas.
Braithewaite & D'Costa (2012) argue that the armed conflict was not a struggle for the
independence of the Hills but rather a level of autonomy to that which the Jummas
historically had. This was denied. In the new constitution there was no recognition of the
distinct identity of the Jummas and the Prime Minister asked the Jumma delegation to
adopt the Bengali identity. The PCJSS was formed as a response to this rejection and its
armed wing Shanti Bahini started mobilizing an armed struggle from the mid-1970s. The
Bangladesh military suppressed the uprising by violent means and carried out torture,
rape and mass killings of Jumma people in several villages for more than two decades.
Nationalist military movements routinely view violence as an acceptable method of
suppressing self-determination movements of minoritized communities. Liyanage (2007),
when speaking about the CHT and comparing it to other countries, observed that it is
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“practically impossible for troops not to violate human rights in conflict situations to
protect the national security of the country” (p. 86).
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed important repercussions of British colonialism on
the Indian sub-continent, especially the Partition of the Indian-subcontinent, and the
ripple effects on minoritized groups. The ripple effect of colonialism was the creation of
Bangladesh as an independent state, and in turn how it feared the Jummas’ selfdetermination movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This is the larger context for the
present-day conflicts around tourism in the area are.
It was the large displacement of people prescribed by the Partition that laid the
basis for ethnic conflicts in all parts of South Asia including Bangladesh. Military
occupation of the Hills, and other parts of the region where indigenous people historically
had customary ownership of land were outcomes of British colonization, categorization
into identity-based groups, and Partition. This military occupation and ethnic domination
in the Hills have rendered the Jummas as the suspicious ‘others’ on the one hand, and as
exotic commodities for consumption on the other.
In the next chapter, I explore military occupation in the Hills in order to illustrate
how militarization is wielded as a political and economic tool to support state control of
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the Jumma population and how this is experienced by the Jummas and how it normalizes
violence.
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Chapter 3: Everyday Military Occupation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
In this chapter I discuss how the state consolidates its power by cultivating a
culture of fear and violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The expansion of state power
emerged in the form of military-controlled tourism in the Hills with ruinous effects on the
indigenous inhabitants of the region. I hope to illustrate how militarization is wielded as a
political and economic tool to support state control of the Jumma population through
tourism. Militarization is experienced by the Jummas as a form of state violence and
remains a symbolic dominating tool that defines Bengali-Jumma relations, constructs the
idea of an ‘ethnic conflict’ and normalizes violence. I am looking at militarization from
the standpoint of the occupied Jummas but also exploring the forms of resistance and
challenges to everyday militarization. Military presence has very different consequences
for dominant and subjugated peoples. Militarization has historically been part of imperial
conquest and settler colonization; in the case of the Hills internal colonization has been
realized through Bengali settlers at the expense of the land belonging to the Jummas.
The Reality of Everyday Military Occupation in the Hills
My first exposure to the level of militarization and surveillance in the Hills was in
February 2009 when I was a journalist and went to the area as a translator for a factfinding visit for the advocacy body, the CHT Commission. It was known that the
Commission’s mandate was to report on the human rights violations and the Hills were
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on high alert. At the entrance to each of the three hill districts, the vehicle carrying us had
to be registered and the foreign members of the Commission had to show their passports
and register their names. Most Bengalis like myself living outside the Hills are unaware
of the sharp contrast of living under military occupation as opposed to living under a civil
administration in the rest of Bangladesh. When middle-class Bengalis do visit the area,
they visit as tourists and their major concern is their own safety and thus they accept this
militarization as a necessary tool to control the nation’s Others on this frontier region and
accept the meta-narrative of preserving Bangladesh’s sovereignty. The state promotes the
idea that despite the presence of ‘terrorists’, it is capable of keeping the area ‘safe’ and
‘peaceful’ for tourism.

Figure 1: A military checkpoint in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts.

Photo: Author, 2009.
At each of our meetings during that factfinding visit we were surrounded by military intelligence officials and the local
government administrators, laboriously taking notes. We were interviewing Jumma
villagers who had lost their land or faced violence from Bengali settler groups or by the
security forces and had failed to receive justice from the system. We had to repeatedly
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tell the intelligence agents to leave our meeting rooms. This didn’t seem to make the local
administration very happy. Of course, this was a high-level, international, fact-finding
team which was specifically there to make a report on allegations of land-grabbing and
human rights violations, so the level of surveillance was very high.
I soon found out that surveillance is normalized even during cultural events
including Jumma festivals and public gathering. Democratic practices are suspended for
the Jummas, and even the police sometimes have very little authority over what happens
here. This I noticed two months after my first visit when I went to Khagrachari again.
This time I went there with my four-year-old son and a friend to see the Biju Festival
(Chakma New Year celebration), the biggest cultural festival of the Chakmas. The other
Jumma communities also celebrate the New Year on the same day, although under
different names.
Our friend Samari Chakma welcomed us into her home in Mohajanpara and told
us we should be prepared for any possible incidents. Although the Biju Festival (around
April 13) is strictly a cultural festival, Jummas remain on very high alert during the time
as there have been many incidents of violence during festivals. The presence of random
plainclothes intelligence officials throughout Khagrachari town during the two days we
spent there clearly spoke of this tension. But we were lucky. This was 2009 and we were
at least able to use our cellphones then. For ten years since the country came under
nationwide cell phone coverage, it remained inaccessible in the Hills. The military
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considered cell phone communication a ‘security threat’ to the area. Finally, in 2008,
ironically under a two-year military-backed caretaker government and a state of
emergency in the entire country, the government decided to open the area for cell phone
coverage. The state of emergency was a testing time for the people of the country. Samari
had laughed at us at the time saying that Bengalis were finally able to understand in those
two years what it was like to live under military occupation.
Fast-forward to 2016 and I arrive in Sajek in August 2016 to find out about
tourism under military occupation for my MA thesis. My companion, anthropologist
Rahnuma Ahmed and I were held up at the military checkpoint for some time. At
checkpoints the military registers each person and vehicles that go through. I gave my
name to Bablu, our companion and along with Mintu, the driver, they went up to the
checkpoint. A few minutes later Bablu came back and said that the officers wanted to
speak to us. We soon learned why they wanted to talk to us directly instead of just taking
down a name.
“Are you deshi [local] or bideshi [foreign]?” asked the officer in charge at the military
checkpoint.
“We are Bangladeshi,” Rahnuma said to the officer.
“They said you are bideshi,” responded the officer pointing to the three Jumma men,
including the driver, who were accompanying us in the car. There were about ten military
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officers visible at the checkpoint. The officer sitting next to the one questioning us began
to fiddle with his rifle.
“So where will you be staying?” the officer asked.
“At the ROCK Sajek,” I answered.
“Why are you staying at the Rock Paradise?” he asked, “it’s outside our protection zone.”
“No no, we’re not staying at the Rock Paradise, we’re staying at the ROCK Sajek, it’s
owned by you [the military], it’s the Regional Officers Club Khagrachari.”
“Did you make a booking there?”
“Yes of course.”
“Why did you two women come here? Why didn’t you bring a man with you?”
“We go around the world on our own, shouldn’t we be able to visit our country on our
own?” laughed Rahnuma.
“Yes, but you have to understand that the situation of this area is dangerous and this place
is full of terrorists. Anything can happen to you.”
I wondered if the officer was aware of the meaning and contradiction of what he
had just said. I had a number of questions going through my mind. If the military feels
that this is a dangerous area why is the state promoting it as a ‘paradise’ for tourists?
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Who are these terrorists and how are their activities characterized as ‘terrorism’? In a
region where an overwhelming percentage of gender-based violence are carried out
against poor Jumma women by either Bengali men or the security forces with impunity,
what specifically was the source of threat to us as women with ethnic and class privilege?
But that was not the place for delving into such political discussions. The military
officer’s casual use of the term ‘terrorist’ was not new. The military categorically refer to
Jumma activists as ‘terrorists’. It was not too long ago when Bengalis who were fighting
against Pakistani oppression were labelled ‘terrorists’ and ‘traitors’ in the Pakistani
nationalist narrative, while in Bangladesh those same people were ‘freedom fighters’. Not
only does it not require a second thought for such terms to be expressed so casually, two
of the largest newspapers of the country lost 25 percent of their advertising revenue
overnight when they referred to Jumma activists shot dead by the military as ‘indigenous’
men instead of ‘terrorists’ (Bergman, 2015). Visweswaran (2013) points out that states
founded on democratic revolutions, once themselves labeled terrorist by colonial regimes,
use the term ‘terrorism’ to discredit and delegitimize the struggles for self-determination.
For the Jummas, however, it was the new nation-state’s categorical oppression and
marginalization that provoked and intensified their resistance. Falk (2013) argues that
occupiers use the language of ‘terrorism’ to delegitimize resistance movements by the
occupied while legitimizing their own violence and security operations. Although Falk
was writing about Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, the same applies to
Bangladeshi authorities who use the same language, wherein the terrorist (the military
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and state police) become victims, and the victims resisting occupation are linguistically
inverted into terrorists.
During our journey to Sajek we observed that most of the other tourists were
young people in their late 20s and 30s, university students or young professionals, from
Dhaka. There were only a few families with young children. The element of ethnic
tension in the area makes for a tourist spot geared for the young, urban, adventurous
professionals, rather than a relaxing family getaway. Whether it was the regular level of
surveillance in Sajek or whether it was because Rahnuma and I were an anomaly in terms
of the regular Sajek tourist profile we had to face further queries in the coming days of
our stay there.
On the first night of our stay at ROCK Sajek hotel, when the two of us were
having dinner at the restaurant of the hotel, an army officer came up to us and asked us if
they could take our photos. He had been asked to send our photos to the ‘headquarters’,
he said. I was not prepared for this and looked at Rahnuma. “Yes, of course,” Rahnuma
responded to the army officer immediately and smiled. The silent Jumma man standing
by with the camera next to the army officer pointed it at us and took a couple of pictures
and then went away. Later the next day, Rahnuma had to face more questions by three
army officers who were sitting by the army canteen. The questions were personal - where
was her village home, where in Dhaka did she live, where was her husband and what did
he do, etc.
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Questioning by the military may have seemed intrusive to us Dhaka-centred
Bengalis, but for Jummas interrogating and questioning are normalized or part of their
daily experience. When speaking to Mikel Chakma about this he had in fact informed me
that he had been to jail so many times that he had trained himself to cope and survive in
captivity. Visweswaran (2013) argues that an occupying power rarely refers to itself as
such and Bangladesh is no exception. In the official state national narrative there is no
acknowledgement that the Jummas have been living under military occupation since the
late 1970s when the army was deployed there under the military dictatorship to quell
Jumma dissent. Three days before returning to Canada, I met with a Jumma activist who
remains underground for security purposes. He was one of those who opposed the CHT
Accord, which he said had watered down all the demands of the Jummas and hence had
compromised the cause of the movement for self-determination. He talked about the
exclusionary nationalism that defines the role of the military in the Hills:
Why do we need the military to guard a village? In fact, you don’t even need the
police, you can have the community police do the work. The state does not need
to spend so much money on the military, there are many other important things
that they can spend it on. They should spend the money on the service sector. By
spending so much on the military in the Hills they are simply instigating a very
violent nationalistic feeling which goes against us.
[Fieldwork, September 2016, translated from Bangla by author]
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However, the military never withdrew or reduced their presence after the
symbolic ‘Peace’ Accord was signed which promised to effectively demilitarize the area.
The Accord besides ensuring a form of autonomy says this about military presence in the
area:
After signing the agreement between the government and the Jana Samhati Samiti
and immediately after the return of the JSS members to normal life all the
temporary camps of military, Ansar and Village Defence Party shall be taken
back to permanent installations except the Border Security Force (BDR) and
permanent cantonments by phases and with this in view, time limit shall be
determined. [Section 17, 1997 CHT Accord]
Aside from a few highly publicized actions to dismantle some temporary military
camps, the overall public presence of the military has remained the same over the years
(IWGIA 2012). Siddiqui (2017) argues that the Accord has invisibilized the militarization
of everyday life ‘post-conflict’ and is used as a justification for “constant surveillance, an
environment of fear, intimidation and self-censorship, and little prospect of justice” (p.
229). A UN Special Rapporteur in 2011 noted that a majority of human rights violations
committed against indigenous peoples in the region could be attributed to the extensive
presence of security forces and the military’s influence on the civil administration in the
area (UNPFII, 2011). Mong Shanoo Chowdhury, who is based in Rangamati is a member
of the CHT Citizens’ Committee said this about military presence:
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Why is there so much security all around us now with six different cantonments?
The CHT seems to be a field training ground for the military to help them to serve
in UN peacekeeping. We have an army firing artillery range and the air force
firing range to support field training. If they accept the terms of the CHT Accord
they will have to close all this, so how will they train for peacekeeping if they
don’t have all this?
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla by author]
It is said that one-third of the total military personnel of the country are deployed
in the Hills (IWGIA, 2012). Given that the Hills are more thinly populated than the rest
of the country, this makes for a very strong and disproportionate military presence. The
IWGIA report estimates 35,000 to 40,000 out of a total of 120,000 military personnel are
deployed in the Hills. Another 10,000 personnel from the Border Guards Bangladesh
(BGB), and 10,000 Ansar and Armed Police Battalions (APBn) paramilitary personnel
are also deployed in the area (IWGIA, 2012). There is no official government statistic on
this as information related to the military is protected by the state. There are six military
cantonments in the three districts of the Hills while there are only 14 cantonments in the
remaining 61 districts of the country. Similar occupations exist in other parts of the subcontinent including Kashmir and the Indian North-East (Visweswaran, 2013). Junaid’s
(2013) research on Indian-occupied Kashmir argues for the importance of demystifying
occupation’s self-image as a state’s magnanimity and capture its actual self as an
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occupying power. Occupation in postcolonial states is wielded as a political and
economic tool and is experienced as a material form of violence and symbolic
domination (Visweswaran, 2013). Nur Khan, a Bengali activist and an Executive Director
of human rights organization, Ain O Salish Kendro, had this to say about the reality of
everyday militarization in the Hills:
The presence of the military in the Hills is overwhelming. They are present within
10 to 20 yards of a village home sometimes. And these military officers are
constantly keeping watch near places where people are going about their daily
activities, women are doing their housework or simply taking a bath. As a result,
their normal life, their normal daily activities are being severely affected as a
result. There is a breakdown of their normal life because of their [military]
presence. Military establishments or any kind of establishments related to the
security forces always try to create fear in society. It’s only by creating fear
within the society that you can repress a society. This effort is always quite visible
in the Hills.
[Fieldwork, August 2016, translated from Bangla by author]
Ahmed (2017) points out that the army suppresses protests against torture and
violence by increasing checkpoints in the area. In response to the killing of a Chakma
activist in 2017 there have been reports of banners being snatched away, posters torn off,
people have been physically restricted from attending a memorial meeting for the man,
87

teams going from Dhaka to investigate the death have been turned away by the army.
“Military rule in the CHT is racialised, only paharis are stopped, prevented, persecuted
and harassed, while Bengalis are allowed to go their way peacefully” (Ahmed, 2017).
Despite information widely circulated in social media about the case and a
complaint to the National Human Rights Commission from Romel’s father, it wasn’t
until his dead body surfaced that the national media reported it (Ahmed, I 2017). Social
media has become the vehicle for carrying news and analysis about the Hills and other
‘sensitive’ national issues in contrast to mainstream media. Journalist Ikhtisad Ahmed
(2017) writes:
Evidently, dissent is unbecoming of Bangladeshis. Protests are, therefore,
suppressed as a matter of national duty. When the army desecrated temples in
Naniachar on May 18 and severely injured several people in the subsequent
protests on May 22, there were no media reports.
Ahmed (2017) refers to a number of violent acts in the Hills that were ignored by
the media or reported in a biased manner. A Facebook post by a Tripura activist about the
attacks in Longodu in June 2017 illustrates this distrust further:
I am reconfirming, I don't trust Bangladesh mainstream newspaper on Indigenous
Peoples issue! And in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region, media is controlled by
the Bangladesh Army. Most of the journalists (except two or three) in the CHT,
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don't have strong moral and ethical position, they are inhuman and backboneless.
They don't go for the real fact when write a report for the news, but they are good
making own (false) story like making a chicken curry with ingredients!
[Original Facebook post, June 2017]
Media Repression of Military Violations
Media bias is not new in the Hills. During the 1980s there was an almost media
blackout in the region. The military government restricted movement of journalists in the
area. Many had to secretly go into the area to do their reports. There is limited
information about the scale of killings during that time. Many local journalists operate in
the area but they do not have the freedom to report about the state-supported violence
there. They receive regular instructions to adhere to the military narrative through what is
euphemized as cha-er dawat (tea invitations) by military officials, or regular briefing
sessions given to the local journalists outlining what may or may not be reported
(Ahmed, 2013). A confidential military document labeled the Strategic Management
Forum (Adnan 2010) in 2010 had explicitly stated the military’s intention of keeping the
media under control, incidentally also couched in the language of ‘objectivity’:
Print and electronic media may be advised to be more objective in their portrayal
of the CHT and the security forces, especially in critical situations. If necessary,
civil administration as government spokesperson, in coordination with security
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forces, may arrange Press Briefing against regional parties’ propaganda. As the
CHT is a ‘Special Region’, the issue of proper role of media on security issues of
the region may be incorporated in the media policy of the impending national
defence policy.
[Translated from original memo from the Armed Forces Division]
In 2015, the military also shot and killed five Jumma activists belonging to the
splinter group of the PCJSS. As soon as the two largest daily newspapers wrote about this
killing, the security discourse was ignited once again, blaming the victims for their own
fate instead of taking the said military officers to task. The military sent official
complaints to the newspapers stating that the dead should have been identified as
‘terrorists’ instead of ‘indigenous men’. When the newspapers did not accede to their
instructions the military asked all foreign-owned corporations to stop advertising in the
two newspapers. Since then, the two newspapers lost more than a fourth of their
advertising revenue (Bergman, 2015).
In 2015, Bangladeshi indigenous filmmaker Aung Rakhine unveiled the first
feature film made in the Chakma language about the community from the Chittagong Hill
Tracts (CHT). The Bangladesh Film Censor Board (BFCD) refused clearance to the film
as a result of which the film could not be shown in public halls inside the country
although it was shown at various overseas film festivals and won critical acclaim (Reza,
2015). The censor board claimed that it was only authorized to give clearance to films
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made in Bangla, the state language according to the national constitution of the country.
Apart from the technicality cited by the censor board, the Ministry of Information of the
Government of Bangladesh also made a formal objection about the film’s content saying
that the film had “…visuals and dialogue which were defamatory to the security forces
and the Government of Bangladesh”, and which was “part of the propaganda against the
military in the CHT” (Letter from Information Ministry 2015, June 29). The film is
about a poor Chakma villager and how he uses his bicycle to earn a living after losing his
job in the city. The visual in question is about 10 seconds long within the one-hour-long
film. It shows the boots of (Bangladeshi) military officers passing through the house of
the Chakma man. While passing through the courtyard of his house the boots are seen
crushing the toys of the man’s young son while the man gets down on his knees in fear to
show respect to the military officers.
Such symbolic scenes of military violence have been depicted many times in
many Bangladeshi films. However, those films have been accepted and many have
received national acclaim because in most Bangladeshi films the military perpetrators are
Pakistani soldiers and the victims are Bengali. These depictions fit perfectly into the
acceptable national narrative and in fact is helped to further reinforce it. Rakhine’s film
on the other hand disturbs this narrative tremendously. In ten seconds Rakhine managed
to stir up a part of Bangladesh’s history that for decades the state has tried hard to keep
out of the narrative, and to ensure it is not discussed publicly or brought into media focus.
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Evictions from Land and Legal Obfuscations
In April 2017 a group of activists, journalists and a politician were barred from
entering Bandarban's Lama upazila when the 14-member team went to investigate the
eviction of Jumma villagers from their ancestral land. The military officers cited security
reasons and prevented the group from going to Lama, saying that there were instructions
from the ‘higher authorities’. The group was later also refused permission to hold a press
conference in Bandarban and meet the district’s Deputy Commissioner (The Daily Star,
2017).
Land acquisition has been a major focus of state occupation of the Hills from the
1970s. Adnan (2010) observes that the armed forces and the local administration in
collusion with political elites have been acquiring common and private land of the
Jummas to expand their economic projects and establishments. Due to the state of legal
pluralism in the Hills there coexists a parallel operation of three major types of land laws
which overlap and thus creates conflicting claims on the same plot of land (Adnan, 2010).
This situation creates vast opportunities for corrupt officials and the political elite. The
CHT (Land Acquisition) Regulation (1958) is a particularly draconian law which
authorises the Deputy Commissioner to acquire and land in the Hills without giving prior
notice to the inhabitants (Adnan, 2010; Roy, 2000). The Bangladesh military, border
guards and other state authorities have already acquired thousands of acres of land

92

without proper legal mechanisms using this law (Adnan, 2010; Chakma & Tripura,
2010).
The struggle between the armed forces and the Jummas over land often results in
forced evictions of the Jummas in the Hills. The Deputy Commissioners in the three
districts have been leasing out lands for industrial plants and commercial plantations to
powerful private companies (Adnan & Dastidar 2010). Swagatam Chakma, whose family
was evicted from their lands, and who is now a writer based in Dhaka said this to me
when I interviewed him:
During 1982-83 all the land belonging to my family was taken away from us by
settlers. I had to change my school at least eight to ten times before I sat for my
matriculation exams [secondary school certificate exams]. Every time the settlers
came in we became internally displaced. Most people would drop out of school if
they went through what I did. But I finished my masters simply because I was too
obstinate. Land is the main source of self-identification for Jummas. Land also
influences cultural development but having the land taken away from us has also
prevented us from the natural development of our culture.
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla by author]
From 1979 to 2010, at least 40,000 acres of land were acquired by Bengali elites
and the military as plantation leases in the Bandarban district along (Adnan, 2010;
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Chakma & Hill, 2013). Levene (1999) characterized the Bangladesh military’s operations
in the Hills as a “creeping genocide” and pointed out that new nation-states often resort to
violence in unoccupied, resource-rich frontier regions in order to overcome their
structural weaknesses. The fear of possible eviction from their lands without any due
process looms large in the everyday lives of Jumma peoples. Green’s (1999) research in
Guatemala following the Guatemalan civil war notes how violence and fear permeated
through people’s everyday lives in the post counter-insurgency militarized situation and
how this is not always perceptible to those outside. In the Hills, the appearance of
military checkpoints, army garrisons, and civil patrols despite being visible to outsiders,
has been normalized. In fact, Jummas often compare their situation to the Palestinians
under Israeli occupation, where checkpoint and armed soldiers permeate the landscape. It
is not until an attack of large proportions takes place that the silenced tension erupts in
public. In the Hills, it is fear that is used as counterinsurgency strategy which has turned
the area into a permanent state of silencing and tension. Sa’di and Abu-Lughod (2007)
points out how between 1948 and 1966 checkpoints have been put in place for the
Palestinian citizens of Israel in order to severely restrict their movement which “was
epitomized by the ubiquity of ever more elaborate checkpoints” (p. 16).
The Politics of Everyday Occupation
I went to Khagrachari in July 2016 for a quick visit to conduct some interviews
before my planned trip to Sajek the following month and was reminded of the difficulties
94

of doing research under the circumstances. After interviewing Samari, I interviewed
Proshanto Chakma and Rashed Rahman (pseudonyms), two young university students
who had also visited various tourist areas and wanted to talk to me about it. I had met
Proshanto and his younger brother Shushanto about five years earlier. They were cousins
of a former Chakma colleague of mine. At that time, I had read a very beautifully written
Bangla essay by Shushanto for his fifth-grade assignment where he wrote about how he
spent Eid day with his family in prayers and food. Not an unusual essay topic for a fifth
grader. However, the irony of that was of course that Shushanto’s family is Buddhist and
they neither pray nor celebrate Eid in their family. Beyond the violence, intimidation and
overt fear propagated through the armed state institutions, occupation also takes place in
the Hills through the informal means.
Although a student of chemistry at university, Proshanto had become a prolific
blogger over the years. He had written some powerful blog posts about his experiences in
his visits to some tourist spots. He and Rashed were not comfortable with being recorded
but agreed to be interviewed, so I took notes. The information they provided to me were
anecdotal and mostly focused on Bandarban, where both the level of surveillance and the
frequency of Bengali tourists is much higher, making fieldwork much more difficult to
conduct.
After talking to the two, Proshanto informed me that his mother who was a school
teacher had invited me to have dinner with them that night. However, Samari was not too
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keen about this. She warned both of us that this was not a good idea under the
circumstances of heightened surveillance, the attack on me and the overall political
situation. As I was a guest at her house and a Bengali she also felt more concerned about
my security. If something happened to me and the authorities found out I was staying at
her house, the blame would fall directly on her and the Jumma political groups. She told
me that her father had warned her about letting her Bengali friends stay at her house
knowing how stories are spinned against Jummas. She had jokingly said that she always
asks her Bengali friends to sign a notarized document before coming to her house, so that
she is not held accountable for what happens to them. Green (1999) argues that fear
rather than being solely a subjective personal experience has also penetrated the social
memory and is a chronic condition where social relations are destabilized and creates
suspicion and apprehension not only of strangers but of each other. The memory of the
violence “gets deeply inscribed into individual bodies and the collective imagination
through a constant sense of threat” (p. 55).
In the Hills disappearances and filing of false cases against activists and
community organizers is a common threat and carried out quite often. This is quite
common throughout Bangladesh. According to human rights organization Ain O Salish
Kendro, at least 284 persons (mostly activists and opposition party sympathizers)
‘disappeared’ throughout the country between 2014 and 2017 (Prothom Alo, 2017). In
August 2016, I met Kobita (name changed) of the Sajek Nari Samaj (Sajek Women’s
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Society) who was recently attacked by unknown assailants. The Massalong Police Station
filed a case against her for obstructing government’s work; as she explained:
I have to give hajira [court attendance] every month. False cases are just a way to
harass us and stop us from protesting the wrongs of the government. If I don’t
give hajira they will issue a warrant against me and arrest me and they can do this
anytime they want. I don’t know why I was attacked but I know that the
administration does not think very well of me. They don’t have a good view of me
because I’m involved with the movement and I have always said I am not
involved with the movement for the sake of it but rather the movement is the only
way I know for my own protection. I don’t want to hurt anyone or kill anyone in
the government. I’m a woman and for my own survival I have to be part of this
movement. Sajek Nari Samaj hasn’t been able to do their work for a long time.
The military is always trying to intimidate us in various ways. They are doing
blank fires from the zone all the time to keep us in fear.
Kobita could not talk to me for too long. She was clearly still traumatized from
the attack. She wore a hat to cover her stitched and shaved head which she had from the
injury to her head. She feared for her life, she said, but also wanted to tell me her story.
The Sajek Nari Samaj had been very active in protesting army atrocities in Sajek since
2008 when the houses of Jummas were burned down and the following harassment by the
military of common villagers. During this time, a number of male villagers were picked
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up and confined by the military. Women also played their part, they got together and
resisted the aggression by the military. Despite the history of rape and sexual assault by
the military during the armed conflict throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Jumma women
have always put up a resistance to this violence.

Figure 2: Women villagers in Sajek
confronting a military vehicle in 2010
following an arson attack in their
villages.

Photo: Jumma activist, 2010.

In 1983 a secret memorandum was circulated to army officers from the top
authorities which encouraged them to marry Jumma women as a counter-insurgency
mechanism (Chakma & Hill, 2013; Guhathakurta, 2001; CHT Commission, 1991).
During Bangladesh’s independence war Pakistani soldiers were also instructed to
impregnate Bengali women. The idea was to produce a generation of children who would
be loyal to Pakistan (D’Costa, 2011). As a result, between 200,000 and 400,000 women
were raped and made sex slaves in Pakistani military camps during the nine months of
Bangladesh’s war of independence (Islam, 2012; D’Costa, 2011; Mookherjee, 2006).
Here too the Bangladesh military seem to have emulated the Pakistan army which
colonized and persecuted the bodies of Bengalis. There are accounts of military officers
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going into schools and parading young Jumma girls in front of them in order to pick them
for marriage (Chakma & Hill, 2013). Many Jumma women who were forcibly married to
Bengalis reported that they were forced to convert to Islam (D’Costa, 2014). Forced
marriages is the literal occupation of indigenous women’s bodies (Siddiqi, 2017) and
seen as a means to assimilate them into Muslim Bengali society; this practice has been
used as a counter-insurgency measure and part and parcel of the darker side of nationbuilding in Bangladesh. One of my interviewees, Dawnai Prue Naly, from the Bohmong
royal family of Bandarban said this about herself being forcibly married to an army
officer:
I was part of an army family. When the military came here they took a strategic
decision to make a bride out of a girl from the royal family. They had their eyes
on me from when I was in seventh grade. And when I was in ninth grade they
took me away and got me married to one of them. At that age I didn’t even know
what marriage was. They took me away from my house and forced me to get
married to him. Until I gave birth to my daughter I really didn’t understand what
marriage was. I was only 16 years old when I had a baby and I stayed in the
marriage for 10 years. I still find it difficult to recall the circumstances under
which I was forced to get married. They asked me to say kobul and I told them,
will you let me go if I say kobul? They said they would and so I said kobul three
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times.1 But they refused to let me go after that and they told me, now you are the
wife of an army officer, you have to stay with him. And when I was 23 years old
and the mother of two children, he abandoned me. Since I had been married to a
Bengali man my society refused to accept me after that.
Through an analysis of military memoirs in the context of Bangladesh’s war of
independence D’Costa (2014b) argues that control of the bodies of women and religious
minorities has played an important role in post-colonial nation-building and colonial
categorizations of difference contributed to the racial and gendered construction of
stereotypes resulting in militarized performances of masculinity. Ironically, while
D’Costa writes about this in the context of the Bengali women victims, after 1971 the
Bengali military was very swift to embrace the role of the perpetrators against Jumma
women. Visweswaran (2013) argues that it is important to focus on the temporalities of
violence, which in the case of military presence and everyday surveillance is a
routinization and systemization of occupation. In the case of the Hills the expansion and
consolidation of military presence from the barracks to tourist resorts is an example of
this systematic expansion of this occupation.
Chakma and Hill (2013) perceive the military occupation in the Hills as a form of
internal colonization. Although some scholars restrict the idea of colonization as
occupation of a foreign land, many assert that the concept has just as much relevance in

1

Saying kobul is an acceptance of marriage in Islam.
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describing land within a state which has a different political and administrative history
and different ethnic demography, languages, cultures, and religions, and subjected to
occupation or colonization. In the case of the Hills, the ideological framing of this
colonization is Muslim-Bengali nationalism (Chakma & Hill 2013). Siddiqi (2017) also
talks about the normalization of militarism through domination and colonization:
“So it is that the material violence and symbolic domination of everyday life in
the CHT are recast as matters of territorial and cultural integrity, economic
development, and national security. Narratives of militarism and counterinsurgency, interwoven with discourses of development and ecological
sustainability, reproduce the CHT as a troubled space that must be tamed; they
also serve to erase relations of power between Bengalis and others (p. 226).”
Sexual violence against Jumma women led many Jummas to relocate from their
homes and lands and seek shelter elsewhere including into neighboring India, thereby
causing many Jumma people to lose their ancestral homes during the armed conflict. But
the sexual violence and impunity by Bengali settlers have continued well beyond the
signing of the CHT Accord and into the present day. In a disturbing trend, medical
practitioners are also complicit in obstructing justice. A number of incidents illustrate that
in the Hills rape of Jumma women are negated by doctors and medical officers refusing
to give an honest medical report in fear of unleashing communal violence and
maintaining good relations between Bengalis and Indigenous people (Chakma, 2014).
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Communal oppression, impunity of perpetrators, a non-cooperative legal system and a
weak traditional justice system, along with land-grabbing hinders access to justice in the
Hills (D’Costa, 2014). Visweswaran (2013) posits that many powers which claim to be
democracies, unleash large-scale military campaigns and wars, thereby contradicting
their claims to democracy, for example the US-led occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan,
the occupation of Palestine by the state of Israel, and the military occupation of Kashmir
and the Northeastern India. It is difficult to assess the occupation of the Hills in numerical
terms as information about the military is concealed from the public and cannot be
accessed even with the Right to Information Act of Bangladesh. This also provides
impunity to individual military personnel from being convicted of human rights
violations.
From its first beginnings, the self-determination movement of the Jummas has
been treated as an insurgency movement, and the state’s response has been
counterinsurgency before and after the CHT Accord of 1997. The mass population
transfer of poor and landless Bengalis, Operation Uttoron and random searches for
‘insurgents’ have been carried out since the 1970s. The CHT Accord did not hinder the
state from counterinsurgency operations in the Hills, which today involves regular
intimidation and random house searches, especially of homes belonging to Jummas.
Filing of false cases and framing charges against Jummas, physical torture and political
harassment has continued unabated. Writing on Kashmir, Junaid (2013) suggests that
occupation can be better understood as possessing ‘‘general features’’ or practices such
102

as the ‘‘physical organization of space, uses of violence, procedures of security,
emergency laws and ordinances, tactical decisions and moves among higher and lower
level figures in power, psychological operations and propaganda” (p. 162) which, while
specific to Kashmir, also resonate with other places under occupation.
In May 2017, a Buddhist monastery in Rangamati was vandalized by the military
(PCJSS, Email newsletter, 2017, May 27). When the locals staged a demonstration
against this act and were on their way to submit a complaint addressed to the Prime
Minister a few days after the attack, they were further attacked by the local military
officers wounding several people and taking three activists into custody (PCJSS, Email
newsletter, 2017, May 27).
Part of the counterinsurgency operations also made the Hills a place for
disciplining government officers. The place became known as a ‘punishment zone’ as it
was considered isolated from the rest of the country where an armed conflict was going
on with antagonism towards Bengali government officials. It is also known to have a high
power-outage rate and infestation of malarial mosquitoes. This is perhaps another raging
contradiction where the state portrays the region both as a ‘punishment zone’ and a
‘paradise’ at the same time. The ‘punishment zone’ has another sinister side to it. In
February 2017, a police officer who had been caught on video having taken part in
burning homes of Santal (plainland indigenous Hindu community of Bangladesh)
villages, was transferred from that area into the Khagrachari district after the High Court
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asked for his withdrawal from Gaibandha (a district in the northern part of Bangladesh
under Rangpur Division) in connection to the arson attack only three months before, in
November 2016. A government official in uniform who publicly carried out acts of
violence against an indigenous community instead of being held accountable for his acts
was placed in an area with a larger indigenous population where conflicts were more
frequent. The transfer was stopped following a protest from human rights activists in
Dhaka. In May 2017, three more police officers, who were held for making up a false
case against a dead man and a toddler, were also ‘demoted’ and ‘punished’ by being
posted in the Khagrachari Armed Police Battalion (The Daily Star 2017, May 14).
Following the 2010 arson attack in Sajek, the Armed Forces Division under the
Prime Minister’s Office developed a ‘Strategic Management Forum’ (Adnan, 2010;
IWGIA, 2012). Apart from plans to rehabilitate the families who had lost their homes
through a collaboration between the military authorities and the Ministry of CHT Affairs,
it also proposed to heighten the surveillance in the area by coordinating activities of all
intelligence agencies in the CHT, including the Director General of Forces Intelligence
(DGFI), the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the District Special Branch (DSB),
under 24 Infantry Division, which would “have a huge impact on attaining the targets of
Operation Uttoron” and this would be done through setting up of a Chittagong Hill Tracts
Intelligence Committee (CHTIC) at divisional level and by Regional Intelligence
Committee (RIC) at regional or brigade level. The implementation body for the
surveillance would be the Home Ministry and the Armed Forces. Under the Strategic
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Management Forum, the military also decided to take up road construction projects in
collaboration with the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry Of Chittagong Hill
Tracts Affairs (MOCHTA). The military also proposed to expand its Engineering
Construction Battalion. By controlling the activities of the UPDF the military also set up
a way of silencing protest, dissent, and the democratic rights of civil disobedience. They
also sought to have more control over the Forest Department. The military sought to
control the work of the CHT Commission, UNDP and other NGOs directly by the Armed
Forces. All this indicated that following the arson attack in Sajek in 2010 the military
sought to increase its overall regulation over the policy decisions affecting the region.
Referring to the Strategic Management Forum Adnan (2010) argues:
Reports in the national press suggest the existence of an alternative blueprint to
the CHT Accord for reorganizing the political and administrative structure of this
region, linking development explicitly with security concerns, engineering politics
to squeeze out regional Pahari parties, and bringing under surveillance what the
media can publicly report about these developments. (p. 31)
In March 2015, the Ministry for Home Affairs issued a public order which
prohibited Jumma people from speaking with anyone from outside the CHT, including
Bangladeshi citizens, without the presence of government or military officials (Siddiqi
2017). This order also heightened surveillance on foreigners, lengthening the time period
of clearance for entry by the intelligence agency to a month. There is no similar clearance
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required for foreigners to work in any other part of the country. Not only was it a
discriminatory order, it was a blatant attempt to silence Jumma resistance and
institutionalize racial/spatial hierarchies (Siddiqi, 2017). This was a continuation of the
discriminatory orders issued from different government offices including the Home
Ministry. There have been orders from the government to local hill district officials
prohibiting them from taking part in indigenous day celebrations, there have been orders
to organizations operating in the Hills to employ 50 percent Bengalis and also to include
50 percent Bengalis as beneficiaries of any projects. All this is clearly part of the
counterinsurgency program ‘Operation Uttoron’ under the military leadership in the
Hills.
The kind of open and accepted form of discrimination towards citizens of a
country has a colonial history in the premises of the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 and
1911. This is a colonial construct (Nigam, 1990; Devi, 1995) made into a law passed by
the British colonial government identifying certain Indians based on their religion and
caste as being 'habitually criminal' and restrictions being placed on their movements with
mandatory and regular police reporting. Nadim explains that in their efforts at knowledge
production the British “reduced the natives to their racial essences” so that these groups
could be policed, suppressed and controlled. Referring to the Criminal Tribes Act and its
parallel with the present situation in the Hills, Khan (2017) argues that the criminalisation
of activities of Jummas results in arbitrary arrests, detention and intimidation of them.
She further adds:
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If one can understand the use of criminalisation as a strategy to manage resistance
by colonialists in the Third World, then it is appropriate to make the leap to see
how this tactic could be effective when used by the post-colonial state against
groups of people that are considered on the margins rather than centre stage in the
narrative regarding nationhood.
Resistance to Military Occupation
In April 2017, Romel Chakma, a 20-year-old visually impaired college student
and a member of the Pahari Chhatra Parishad (Hill Students Council), otherwise known
as PCP, the student wing of United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) was taken into
custody by the military in Rangamati. While in army custody he was brutally tortured and
killed (Ahmed 2017, May 14). The police informed the media that there were no
allegations against Romel and the military tried to hand over Romel’s body to the police
but when the police saw the condition of his body they refused to receive it. In order to
hide the torture marks, the military burned the body of Romel Chakma and called it a
‘cremation’. As Ahmed (2017, May 18) points out:
History has proven, time and again, both in this land, in the region, and the world
over, that political problems must be resolved politically, consensually. Military
options, whether war, or counterinsurgency, don’t work. The world’s strongest
military has not been able to crush the spirit of resistance of the invaded and
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occupied, neither in Afghanistan nor in Iraq, despite both countries having been
ruined and devastated.
Chakma communities carry out cremation of their dead family members and there
are various funeral rituals related to the cremation. However, this ‘cremation’ was carried
out by the military officers without the presence of family and friends (New Age 2017,
April 24). These ‘cremations’ have become a new strategy to erase evidence of
systematic crimes by the military against Jumma activists. While military and police
officers attend the religious rites of a Bengali man killed in the Hills in June 2017 (as
shown below in the picture), Romel, who is a Chakma man from a poor family, has been
reduced to a non-grievable life through the Bengali nationalist discourse. Butler (2004)
describes a ‘grievable life’ as one who belongs to a higher social hierarchy and
humanized by having a name, face, personal history and family. She notes in the context
of the Israel-Palestine context that Palestinians who are killed by the Israeli army with
support from the United States are dehumanized and rendered non-grievable by not
having their names or other details made public, by having them rendered ‘unreal’ in the
public imaginary. She writes:
If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of
violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already
negated. They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather,
never ‘were’ (p. 33).
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Figure 3: A military officer
attends a Muslim religious ritual
for a Bengali man who was
killed in June 2017. The banner
says: “Protest against the killing
of motorcyclist Nayan by Pahari
terrorists”.

Photo: Collected from activists, 2017.

Romel Chakma is not the first Jumma activist to have been targeted by the
military and silenced through brutality. Political activists have been targeted for
abduction and killing during the armed movement. Ranglai Mro, a Mro leader and
headman from Bandarban was brutally tortured by the military in 2007, during a
nationwide state of emergency, when he was protesting land dispossession of the Mro
people by the activities of the military. The case of the abduction of Kalpana Chakma by
a military officer in 1996 is particularly emblematic of Jumma women’s resistance to
military occupation and how this feminist resistance was viewed as one of the biggest
threats to the military’s might.
Kalpana was an outspoken Jumma rights activist of the Hill Women’s Federation
and in June 1996 she was abducted by Lt. Ferdous very late one night from her house in
the presence of her two brothers and mother. While working as the coordinator of the
109

CHT Commission I was involved with the efforts of lawyers and activists who were
working to bring justice to Kalpana’s family. In June 2014, prior to one of the numerous
hearings in the Rangamati court, a group of journalists, activists and I met with the
investigator of the case at the time. The Superintendent of Police of Rangmati who was in
charge of the investigation at the time told us without any reticence that she did not
believe Kalpana was abducted and thought instead she was hiding in India. This
corroborated with the military version of events of the time. For some the military tried to
construct a story of a romantic affair between Kalpana Chakma and Lt. Ferdous. When
the army failed to convince people about this they gave out leaflets promising a reward to
anyone who could find her. Siddiqi (2017) argues:
Keeping the story of Kalpana Chakma alive works as a powerful form of
resistance to Bengali domination. The Bangladeshi state and the armed forces
would like to erase the entire Kalpana Chakma episode (p. 231).
Lt. Ferdous is currently known to be posted in Mymensingh Cantonment and Kalpana
still remains missing. Bangladeshi activists, lawyers, scholars and international
organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Survival
International, CHT Commission have all substantiated through their investigations and
reports that Kalpana Chakma was in fact abducted in 1996. Siddiqi points out through
this case how the Bangladesh army helps to construct the ethnic “other,” in a strategy to
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systematically erase the disappearance from political memory (Siddiqi 2017). Chakma
and Hill (2013) point out:
Although the nationalist mainstream media never characterizes it as such, the
presence of the military in the Hills and the control of the nationalist public
narrative is a fallout from the violent colonization of the Hills by the Bangladesh
armed forces and Jumma women have been particularly targeted in this
colonization.
Conclusion
Occupation is based on the denial of the right to self-determination (Junaid 2013).
This chapter describes the specific nature of military occupation as it exists in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. While occupation exists in varying different forms all over the
world, and there are many similar examples of the contradictions that are presented by
this form of occupation. There is in fact a denial by the state that this is an occupation.
Even the Bengali civil society in general consents to the military presence in the Hills,
not only supporting the use of violence by the military but also contributing to a national
discourse of it being a necessary part of protecting the sovereignty of the state. States
tend to give priority to borders and territories and protect them through violence while
disregarding rightful claims of different communities and populations. Jummas have been
taking refuge in India to escape from state and development related eviction from the
1960s. The contradiction is created when the same institution that creates a state of
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occupation and uses violence over a particular community is in control of the tourism and
realizes its corporate and political interests through this act. The peculiarity of military
occupation in the Hills in Bangladesh is that the occupiers present themselves as a
democratic nation-state. The democracy of the occupiers is thus in direct contradiction
with the very undemocratic and violent nature of their occupation of these areas.
Ironically, defining themselves as democratic helps legitimize this occupation and
violence. This democracy is made to serve territorial nationalism, a discourse within
which occupation, as an ongoing war on the frontiers of the state, plays the role of a kind
of nationalistic glue that artificially binds the nation together (Junaid, 2013). Under these
circumstances military-controlled tourism can be seen as what Rhoda Kanaaneh calls
“soft occupation” (Visweswaran 2013), one which is used as a strong argument for
protecting the tourists and which justifies the presence of the military.
In the next chapter, using ethnographic data from my fieldwork I look at how
tourism is a powerful site which reflects the Bengali state’s national project, which rejects
the rights of the Jummas to land and identity and how the Bengali nationalist narrative
enables structural and symbolic violence through the promotion of the tourist industry
and the invoking of the need to protect the territorial integrity of Bangladesh.
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Chapter 4: The Structural and Symbolic Violence of Tourism in the Hills
In this chapter, I examine present-day tourism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to
argue that it is underpinned with structural and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1992) that
expedites and expands a four-decade long colonization process by the ruling elite in
Bangladesh. Although it is promoted as a development project, in reality the ruling elite
which owns the industry and reaps its profits, not least the military institution. This
primarily Bengali elite has been expanding on and expropriating Jumma land, regularly
resorting to violence and cooptation to achieve its ends. Relatedly, I argue that the
asymmetrical power relationship between Bengali tourists and Jumma local residents has
evolved through a history of state expansion on Jumma people’s lands achieved through
violence and impunity, as well as policies that encourage exclusionary citizenship and the
construction of ethnic-based hierarchies. The ethnicity of Jummas has become a tourist
commodity, which conceals the structural inequalities created by the nation-state between
Jummas and Bengalis. Tourism is a powerful site for this socio-spatial politics, and
clearly reflects the Bengali state’s national project, which violently rejects indigenous
rights to an autonomous identity and the rights to the land in the Hills. This history of
Bengali nationalism enables structural and symbolic violence under the banner of
protecting and promoting the tourist industry and the territorial integrity of Bangladesh.
Tourism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts embodies the socio-spatial politics and practices of
state territorialisation where the struggle over territory, identity and history plays out
between the tourists and the locals.
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“Shanti Shompriti Unnoyon”
During my fieldwork, I spent three days in Ruilui Para (village), popularly known
as the ‘Sajek tourist spot’. This area under Rangamati Hill District was declared a
Reserve Forest by the Bangladesh government after the country’s independence. Before
opening it up as a popular tourist spot, it was a very remote area inhabited by mostly
Tripura and Lushai communities, who have been internally displaced by state policies
and ‘development’ projects. In Bangladesh, the Forest Department is known to be a
corrupt state institution which instead of preserving the forests for ecological balance,
profits from the sale of timber. Adnan (2010) points out that there are instances in which
the Forest Department has been found to “… use false reports about the areas to be
acquired and/or bypass due processes of state acquisition in order to take over Pahari
lands in the CHT” (p. xix). In other areas of Bangladesh outside the Hills, Khalil (2007)
argues that the Forest Department colluded with international donors such as the Asian
Development Bank and World Bank in “financing projects of mass destruction in the
name of development, destroying acre after acre of Sal forest”. The declaration of Sajek
as a Reserve Forest under the jurisdiction of the Forest Department thus was never meant
to ensure its protection from corporate exploitation.
Being on the border area, Sajek has a history of giving refuge to displaced people.
Before Bangladesh became independent, indigenous Mizo rebels who were fighting
against the Indian government had taken refuge in the area with support from the
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Pakistan government. At a critical time when the Mizo movement was going strong,
Bangladesh became an independent nation with support from the Indian government, thus
the Mizos suddenly found themselves in a new and enemy country, without support from
the Pakistan government and had to flee the territory overnight using various routes
(Schendel 2015).
Although Sajek technically falls under Baghaichari Upazila (sub-district) of the
Rangamati Hill District, the route from Rangamati town is complicated and tourists favor
the faster land route through the Khagrachari Hill District. Going through Rangamati
requires taking a boat through the Kaptai Lake and then traveling another 35km uphill.
Sajek Valley is about 70 kilometers from Khagrachari town going via Dighinala Upazila,
under Khagrachari district. Baghaichari is the largest Upazila in Bangladesh and Sajek
Union (rural area) is the largest union in Bangladesh (702 sq miles). It takes about three
hours to travel to Sajek tourist point from Khagrachari town. There are several checkposts along the way from Khagrachari to Sajek Valley but the main military check-post is
by the Dighinala army cantonment where the military collects information about all the
passengers and their travel itinerary.
On the North of Sajek is India’s Tripura, East is India’s Mizoram, West is
Khagrachari and in the South is Rangamati. The district of Rangamati begins under
Baghaichari Upazila at the end of Dighinala. The Baghaihat Bazaar is the biggest market
in the area. In 2010, this Bazaar was a scene of conflict between Jummas and new
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Bengali settlers who were being brought in to build the roads for development and
tourism (IWGIA, 2010). During that time, military officers would harass Jummas coming
to the bazaar in various ways, including by forcing them to get down from their vehicles
and walk some part of the path. Sajek Nari Samaj (Sajek Women’s Society) and Sajek
Bhumi Rakkha Committee (Sajek Land Protection Committee) had called for a boycott of
the bazaar which had led to further clashes and the military had detained many Jumma
men. In response Jumma women had come out with sticks and brooms in a face-off with
the military (IWGIA, 2010). Now this bazaar, along with Masalong bazaar, is the main
hub from where all the food supply for the tourists come from.
The roads from Dighinala to Sajek are rough, narrow and Steep. Ruilui Para is
about 2000 feet above the sea level. It is impossible for an ordinary two-wheel drive car
to go up such hills. The Chander Gari (moon vehicle) which we hired from Khagrachari
is a special four-wheel drive car. Mintu Chakma, our driver, was a seasoned driver as we
understood from his conversation and later confirmed from his skilled driving. The trick
in driving uphill, he told us, was to not stop and to keep a good distance from the cars on
both sides. The narrow width of the road made it tricky sometimes when cars from the
opposite direction were coming. But unless it was a large army truck it was possible to
pass through without too much trouble. We were traveling in a chander gari, a fourwheel drive converted pickup truck with three rows of open seats and a top. Although one
would think the top is meant for keeping personal belongings in we soon found out that
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young Sajek tourists are more likely to use the seats for that purpose and the top for a
more ‘thrilling’ ride, despite its
obvious dangers and more likely
because of it.

Figure 4: Young Dhaka-based tourists
on top of a chander gari.

Photo: fieldwork, 2016.

We came across several sign boards put up by the military asking tourists not to throw
candy or biscuits to the Jumma children. Early on in 2016 a Jumma child was run over
and killed under the wheels of a tourist vehicle when she ran in front of it to grab candy
that was being thrown out from the car (CHT Observer 2016, Feb 18). Throwing candy at
Jumma children had apparently become a new tourist practice in Sajek. On the military’s
website under ‘Concerns’ it advises tourists to: “Carry Chocolates for the local children
which will make them happy” (Regional Officers’ Club Khagrachari, 2014a). Clearly the
military was trying to reproduce the colonial trope of creating a spectacle by exploiting
the body of the native.
The military promotes the area as the Regional Officers’ Club Khagrachari
(ROCK Sajek). Although it is promoted as Khagrachari by name the area is technically
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under Rangamati. Even their website says “A journey to the paradise of KhagrachariSajek” (Regional Officers’ Club Khagrachari, 2014b). There was once a suggestion under
the Strategic Management Forum (mentioned in chapter 3) to bring Sajek under
Khagrachari. It would make the administration of the tourism in Khagrachari and Sajek
more manageable under one military garrison. Under ROCK Sajek there are two militaryrun hotels– the Sajek Resort at the very beginning of Ruilui Para (Ruilui is a Lushai word
meaning ‘creek full of treasures’) and Runmoy (Lushai word meaning ‘beautiful house’)
marking the end of Ruilui Para, a Border Outpost and the beginning of Konglak Para
(another village frequented by tourists). Between these two hotels are numerous Tripura
homes, most of them have been converted by their owners into cottages for tourists. The
Tripura Jumma people have been living here for generations and their presence makes it
an ‘authentic’ eco-tourism experience. Despite the history of conflict in the area, the
military paints a different picture in their online marketing materials:
“Khagrachari is a strikingly lovely fraction of the Chittagong hill tracts of
Bangladesh. It is a sample of ever-green woody heavens with natural waterfalls,
dancing white-grey cloud and of course myriads of colorful singing birds and
exotic animals. The picturesque landscape is adorned with starling hills, steep
cliffs wedged between cloud and sky, rivers and lakes filled with legends
mysterious caves, green-gold woods lining the tribal villages.” (Region Officers'
Club Khagrachari, 2014b).
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Figure 5: An aerial view of Ruilui
Para, Sajek tourist area.

Photo: ROCK Sajek website.

We stayed two nights
at the non-air-conditioned twin rooms at Sajek Resort which charges Tk. 10,000 ($165
CAD) per night (Table 2). A full advance payment has to be made through Trust Bank,
the military owned private commercial bank. When I was making the payment at a Trust
Bank branch the employee at
the bank didn’t hold back her
shock at the room rent. She
asked me if I was just booking
a room or a full hotel.

Photo: Room rates ($1CAD = Tk. 60)
at the Sajek Resort with rates that vary very widely for the military and civilians (Source: ROCK Sajek
website).
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The young Bengali tourists do not stay at the two army hotels. The Tripura homes
converted to cottages are more affordable options for them charging between Tk. 1000
(CAD 16) and Tk. 3000 (CAD 48) per night. The two army resorts are frequented by
families of military officers. The table above shows how military officers have to pay a
lower rate at the hotels in a bid to keep the hotels exclusive. Ordinary tourists are not
allowed to go inside ROCK
Sajek unless they have booked
rooms there.

Figure 6: Military signboard saying
‘Shanti Shompriti, Unnoyon.’

Photo: Fieldwork, 2016.

There are several military signboards in the tourist areas in Sajek saying ‘Shanti
Shompriti Unnoyon’ in Bangla, meaning ‘peace, harmony and development’. In the three
days that I spent time in Sajek tourist area I could see that the Bengali tourists could
easily feel a sense of ‘peace’ and ‘harmony’ during the few days they spend in the area.
With the visible military presence in the area looking after their welfare it did create a
sense of security for the tourists. They did not need the know what the threat was that the
army was protecting them from. The few tourists to whom we spoke detailed their visits
to other places in the Hills, where they were planning to visit next, which of the Jumma
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food and clothing they were fond of and the simplicity of the Jumma people. They
seemed to be happy to be immersed in the landscape and in the company of each other.
The history and politics of the place was not of an immediate concern for them.
One of the two helipads belonging to the military on Ruilui Para was a very
popular spot for tourists. On the first day, we found a group of nine university students
sitting in a circle discussing relationship values with each other. The area is known for
being a spot from where one can view both sunrise and sunset. Mizoram’s villages are
visible from the spot. Hall (2007) argues that it is indigenous tourism that best illustrates
how tourism never occurs in a political vacuum. He points out that every decision
regarding indigenous tourism is a political process and involves struggle for power.
Mikel Chakma, a Jumma activist of the Hill Students Council under UPDF, alluded to
this when he spoke to me:
You don’t need a gun to kill me. You don’t need a knife to kill me. You can kill
me just through doing your form of ‘development’. Sajek is nothing but a way of
slowly killing us, of getting rid of us. This is not development for us. The kind of
development you are doing through tourism has evicted Jumma people from their
land. So who is this development meant for? We don’t want this development.
We will only consider it ‘development’ if the local people are part of that
development and the local people are beneficiaries of that development. We want
an end to this process. For us, each of the tourist spot is a weapon against us. We
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(Hill Students Council) not only oppose this form of tourism, we want to see an
end to this. It’s not just our land that is at stake here, it is we who are at stake.
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from the Bangla by author]

Figure 7: Jummas in Sajek protest state-supported
land-grabbing and illegal settlement in 2011.

Source: CHT Commission fact-finding visit, 2011.

Army presence clearly means different things to different people, depending on
their political and social identities and allegiances. Muktasree Chakma Sathi’s said this
about the military presence:
Bengali tourists of course feel safe when they see the military, because the locals
look different from the Bengalis. When the Bengalis come here and see that the
military officers look like them, they feel safer under them. Also for so many
years such a narrative has been formed about Jummas that they are all against
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peace, so now it’s difficult to understand otherwise. Today, you and I went to a
restaurant 10 minutes away from my house [in Rangamati] which cost me 20
takas and we had to go past five army trucks. If you have to run into five army
trucks in a 10-minute distance imagine the chilling situation we live in the Hills,
why would I even feel like coming out of the house?
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from the Bangla]
Muktasree completed a post-graduation in law at Chittagong University but
worked as a journalist at several newspapers of the country and now runs a women’s
organization known as Supporting People and Rebuilding Communities. Based in
Rangamati where she grew up, her organization trains young Jumma men and women on
legal issues related to violence. Since rape, forced prostitution and other sexual violence
of Jumma women happens quite widely around the Hills, her organization has taken up
training young Jummas to understand the underlying politics of control and build up a
resistance to combat such violence at the community level in the absence of justice from
the local administration. D’Costa (2014) points out how sexual and gender-based
violence has been used as a tool to intimidate Jummas into selling their land at bargain
prices often the land is resold to military personnel and their families which helps them to
invest in the tourism industry “contributing to the cycle of militarisation of the CHT” (p.
35). D’Costa (2014) argues that due to poverty Jumma women have limited access to the
formal justice system and reliable legal representation. This combined with the “culture
123

of impunity” (p. 43) that is characteristic of the Hills, violence affects Jumma women and
their families disproportionately.
The Ruilui Para resort area is a long strip of road with cottages, restaurants and
Jumma homes lining both sides. After the resorts were set up, the military had painted all
the fences with the red and green color of Bangladesh’s national flag. This national
symbol asserted that the territory and its people belonged to Bangladesh. The Jummas
needed to be reminded that they were part of Bangladesh and their businesses needed to
visibly demonstrate that allegiance. This is a visibly exclusionary state-sponsored
national assimilation project. Swagatam Chakma points out:
My father was part of a drama group and so we would have rehearsals in our
house all the time. I grew up watching all this around us. But when we were
running around from one place to another after being evicted from our homes we
struggled just to get food for ourselves every day, those things never came back to
our house again. This is how the cultural practices disappeared from our lives. If I
grew up in a healthy and normal environment music and culture would be a big
part of my life, but that has been robbed away from us. The Bangladesh state is
using the same policy against indigenous people that have been used by Australia,
Canada or the US. They’ve nearly wiped out the indigenous people and the areas
where they used to live have been turned into tourist spots. This happened in these
country 50-100 years ago and its happening in Bangladesh now.
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[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla]

Figure 8: The military painted Jumma
people’s homes with red and green of the
Bangladesh national flag.

Photo: fieldwork, 2016.

Siraj and Bal (2016) point out that
exclusion and marginalisation of minorities has been advocated by the power holders in
Bangladesh by focusing on ethnicity and religion as the most vital factor of their national
identity. The painting of the Jumma homes on the one hand symbolizes assertion of state
territorial power over the Jummas’ lands and bodies but is also symbolic of the exclusion
of the Jummas from the national imagination by othering and criminalizing them. This is
also an illustration of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence and domination (Bourdieu
& Wacquant 1992) where he described how societies are classified and legitimize those
classifications in order for one group to dominate the other. He points out that dominant
groups have to do little to maintain this dominance.
The day we arrived in Ruilui Para, we were told that about 30 tourists vehicles
had arrived – each carrying anywhere between 10 to 20 tourists. Nitol Tripura, who
owned the Tong Resort said that he was thinking of naming it the Blue Mountain Cottage
and perhaps build an additional cottage after the obvious success of this one. Workers
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were busy working with wood to build the rooms and beds in the hotel. He said that they
had started working on the hotel about two weeks ago and it would be done by the end of
the weekend.
While walking along the road I spotted Borun Tripura2 and his friends going past
us in an auto-rickshaw. Borun was an activist for the Pahari Chattra Parishad (Hill
Students’ Council). He was visiting Sajek with his one of his Bengali friends, Aftab
(names changed for privacy). Borun now lived in Dhaka and worked for a bank where he
met his companion. We had met at the bus stop in Dhaka on our way to Khagrachari. In
Khagrachari we had parted ways, but met up again in Sajek. They had arrived in Sajek in
a three-wheel autorickshaw, a slightly more risky but cheaper way of traveling to Sajek.
After a long conversation, Aftab mentioned that he was an entrepreneur and the purpose
of the trip to Sajek was more business than pleasure. Aftab was looking for a location in
Sajek to set up a barbecue restaurant with indigenous song and dance performance on
weekends. The idea was that Borun would buy the land under his Tripura name, but
Aftab would provide the rest of the investment. This arrangement allowed the ownership
to remain under a Jumma person, thus giving the restaurant Jumma ‘authenticity’. The
profits, however, would go to the Bengali with the money and business acumen. When
Aftab was not within earshot Borun confided in us that he was not entirely comfortable
with this agreement. His money-making instincts were in conflict with his political
beliefs as an activist resisting Bengali dominance. In a cooptation power relationship,
2

Names changed for confidentiality.
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Hall (2007) cautions against thinking about unwilling and willing compliance to
domination as mutually exclusive, asserting that “one can consent to power and resent the
mode of its exercise”.
We spoke to the people working very diligently at a work site where we could see
6 cement pillars. At this construction site, there were about a dozen Bengali day-laborers
and when I asked one of the workers how big the building would be, I was told it was
going to be an eight-story hotel. Mintu told me that this would be a Deputy
Commissioner’s hotel but it would be impossible to build an eight-story building on top
of a mountain. Adnan (2010) argues that some of the biggest grabbing of Jumma people’s
lands in the Hills have been by state agencies including the Forest Department and the
military, in collusion with the Deputy Commissioners who have to give the final
approval. He also adds that proper procedures are often not even followed.
Behind the Proverbial Tourists’ Blinkers
On our way back from Sajek our companions strongly advised us to visit Alutila.
The main attraction in Alutila is a cave, also referred to as the “mysterious cave”, which
is a 100-metre-long cave going underground where sunlight does not reach. Tourists
usually make a fire torch and carry it with them through the cave giving it the
“mysterious” feel. As tourists who visit Sajek have to enter the Hills through Khagrachari
district they almost invariably visit Alutila as part of the adventure package. The Alutila
cave however is an old tourist spot that was in fact set up by the Hill District Council and
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not under the auspices of the military. One has to climb down more than 200 steps to
reach the mouth of the cave. Although Khagrachari had been the least popular tourist spot
until recently, the possibilities opened up with the popularity of Sajek and its potential
began to be recognized with adventure-seeking tourists.
While I was conducting my fieldwork, the Bangladesh Economic Zone Authority
(BEZA) under the Prime Minister's Office set up the Alutila Special Tourism Zone,
Khagrachari on 700 acres of land. Although the government marked it as ‘khas’
(government) land, the area was inhabited by around 518 mostly Tripura families in 21
villages in the three Mouzas for generations. Most of the families carried out jhum and
other forms of cultivation on this land, which also included educational institutions,
religious complexes and cremation grounds. The setting up of this special tourist zone
would mean the eviction of the people and complete destruction of their livelihoods. Both
the Jumma political groups, UPDF and PCJSS along with the local Tripura families and
the wider activist groups in Dhaka protested this government decision and the plan was
finally cancelled in October 2016, after I had returned from my fieldwork. The fear of
being evicted from their homes and land is something that Jummas live with every day.
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Figure 9: Jumma homes with posters protesting the
government’s proposal to take over 700 acres of
land for tourism in Alutila, Khagrachari.

Photo: Sanjay Kumar Barua, 2016.

None of the tourists we came
across in Sajek were aware of these
political developments. At the Helipad we
had spoken to a newly-married couple from Dhaka, Dipon and Nimmi who were
proclaimed adventure-seekers. Since they got married they informed us they decided to
visit a new place every time they went on holidays, and confessed that all their earnings
were spent on these. Dipon said he appreciated the different culture of the Jummas and
that was an obvious attraction for him, but he noted that it was ‘unfortunate what the
Jummas were doing in the Hills’. When I asked him what it was about the Jummas that
bothered him, he said that they seemed to have an inherent dislike for Bengalis and
Bangladesh and were constantly fighting and carrying out mischief. He seemed unaware
of the state’s land-grabbing activities. Tourists are thus ‘light-hearted’ figures who did
not care much about the systemic inequalities between the tourists and locals. As Salazar
(2017) observes, tourists are unaware of the impact they had on their destinations. And
the military is quite content to keep it that way. The ROCK Sajek military website uses
flowery language when describing the area to tourists:
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Far from the crowd, urban and noisy places, Sajek is a quiet place to relax and
rejuvenate you away from the hustle & bustle of the city . . . The small village on
the mountains is full of exotic beauty filled with eco-friendly environment.
Mountains covered with lush green trees, cold atmosphere, fresh air, beautiful
valleys and most importantly clouds on the roads hugging you with full of
happiness and one of the different feelings that you will have, after seeing the
unseen beauty of both sunrise and sunset from the same place. (Region Officers'
Club Khagrachari, 2014.)
While I was writing my thesis in May/June 2017 the Bangladeshi newspapers
reported that an acute food shortage had hit Sajek. The Daily Star reported that without
immediate government intervention people would starve to death. The newspaper also
reported about the local government’s corruption with the food aid that had already come
from the central government. Such food aid usually is followed by such news of
corruption. I followed on social media my activist friends back in the Hills as they
combined their efforts to do their own fund-raising for the affected families. The people
of the Hills have found their own way of coping with adversity and have learned a long
time ago not to depend on any meaningful help from the government. The food crisis in
Sajek was not even over when Bengali settler groups in Langadu Upazila of Rangamati
burnt down more than two hundred homes of Jumma people. Within a few weeks of the
arson attack devastating landslides in parts of Rangamati, Bandarban and Chittagong
killed about 130 people. It seemed like yet another paradox where the economic hardship
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of the native Jummas in Sajek remain hidden through the flowery language used to
present Sajek as a paradise for tourists.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts as a “Business Hub”
Tourism in the Hills fulfills two objectives. First is the capitalist business objective
with little or no regard for environmental impacts or impacts on indigenous livelihood
and culture. The second is conflict management. I interviewed Meghna Guhathakurta a
researcher and former professor of international relations at Dhaka University, a member
of the National Human Rights Commission and a long-time activist for the rights of the
Jumma peoples. She pointed out:
CHT as business investment of Bengalis is a model for controlling this so-called postconflict situation. Obviously, this investment is expected to be made by the dominant
community and those sections of the community that are already there, which is the
army. It was there from before, even during the so-called insurgency, in a closed area,
the tourism was there in a particular, restricted way.
The Government of Bangladesh declared 2016 to be the year of tourism and in May
2017 the Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism, Rashed Khan Menon, said the
government was taking initiatives to develop the Hills as “a business hub for South and
Southeast Asia using utmost potential of huge resources of the hilly region” (The
Independent, 2017). The minister indicated that it intended to build the CHT as an
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“international standard tourist zone.” Although the tourism at present caters to Bengali
tourists, the government clearly aims to expand its business to foreigners who will bring
in more revenue. The present political situation, however, would make it very
challenging to attract foreigners. There is a travel warning for foreigners against traveling
to the Hills. The government of Canada also advises their citizens not to travel to the
Chittagong Hill Tracts when they are traveling to Bangladesh (Government of Canada,
2017).
As the tenth most densely populated country in the world, with a population of 160
million people, Bangladesh struggles to move beyond its status as a developing nation. In
an effort to achieve this, the government has been trying to sell itself as an attractive
tourist destination. Although the military presence has made it difficult for foreigners to
enter the CHT, the tourism ministry is already said to have identified new locations in the
CHT for developing tourism and finding ways to attract foreign tourists (CHT Regional
Council memo, Feb 23, 2015). The PCJSS has expressed its displeasure at the decisions
taken by the ministry as the indigenous communities have not been consulted about these
plans. The World Bank also has a proposed $360million sub-regional connectivity project
between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh as part of which two land ports will be
built in the CHT which roads going through the CHT will connect to India and Myanmar
and this will increase the flow of people through the CHT (Qatar Tribune, 2016).
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The Ministry for CHT Affairs (MOCHTA) which was established through a
provision under the CHT Accord and was initially thought would help to smoothen the
implementation of the Accord in fact is more involved in promoting tourism and cultural
aspects related to the Hills. The tourism projects undertaken by the government are
always a joint venture between the MOCHTA and the Ministry of Civil Aviation and
Tourism. Although it did formally hand over the management of local tourism to three
Hill District Councils in 2014 (Chakma and Chakma 2015), in practice nothing has
changed. The Hill District Councils themselves have not been able to function according
to the provisions set out in the Accord as there haven’t yet been elections for posts under
the Councils. Until the elections take place, the positions will continue to be occupied by
the individuals belonging to the political party in power.
The Tourist Industry and Manufacturing of Public Consent
Jumma activists and civil society groups have raised their concerns about the loss
of Jumma people’s lands through tourism but the activities of the various state agencies
to expand tourism without consultation with the local people has continued unabated. The
Minister for Tourism, also chairman of the Workers Party of Bangladesh, however stated
that the ministry was looking to include more Jumma people in the mainstream
development activities. At a workshop organized by the MOCHTA and International
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) titled “Destination Management
Plan” in May 2017 he also said that the government was looking to turn the Hills into a
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‘business hub’ saying that the area “..could be one of the major tourist destinations of the
world for its natural beauty with hills, rivers, lakes and waterfalls” and that the “…
government is working to build the CHT as an international standard tourist zone” (The
Independent 2017). Neither the government, nor the military has said anything about
resolving the land conflicts in the area or mentioned anything about the eviction of
Jumma people from the area. Although the MOCHTA was established as part of the CHT
Accord to ensure the welfare of the Jumma people, in reality it has become a mouthpiece
for the government’s activities. MOCHTA is actively involved in promoting tourism in
the area with no consultation with the Jumma peoples. In recent times, it has sponsored
cycling tours, marathons and various kinds of festivals. It has said nothing about
resolving land
conflicts or land
loss of the Jumma
peoples.

Figure 10: A poster for a cycling tour in the Chittagong Hill Tracts sponsored by MOCHTA.

Photo: Ministry Of CHT Affairs, 2017.

One of the most contentious problems in the Hills is that land disputes between
Jummas and Bengali settlers are yet to be settled. For years the Land Commission set up
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through the CHT Accord has failed to settle these disputes as there have never been any
consensus over how to settle them. The Accord stated that:
The government shall allot additional funds on priority basis for implementation
of increased number of projects in CHT. New projects formulated with an aim to
make necessary infrastructures for facilitating development in the area shall be
implemented on priority basis and the government shall provide funds for these
purposes. The government shall, considering the state of environment in the
region, encourage developing tourism for tourists from within the country and
abroad.
In terms of tourism, the Jumma political groups have identified that at least 1700
acres of land, locations of tourist resorts by the military, have caused the eviction of at
least 700 Jumma families from 26 villages (Chakma and Chakma, 2015). The military
resort in Nilgiri in the Bandarban hill district for example, evicted 200 Mro and Marma
families from six villages in the area and though they have 16 acres of land recorded
under the facility, they ended up acquiring 60 acres. There are numerous examples of
such land-grabbing for tourism throughout the Hills.
Sajeeb Chakma note that 15 new locations had been identified by the military and
the tourism ministry, along with MOCHTA, for setting up new tourist complexes. when I
interviewed him he pointed out that the Tourism ministry had held a meeting with the
military to identify these locations:
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The way it stands now, the BGB, military or any company, private individual or a
government agency can set up tourism here. There is no recognition of the land
loss of indigenous people here and no respect for indigenous people’s culture, for
the special governance system in the area, this is where we are concerned. We
have spoken to people there and found out all this information about how land
was grabbed. There is no clarity over who is going to give leadership and deal
with the issues. It is also not clear to us what benefit will come to the adibashi
people here or what harm will come to them – their land rights, issues related to
their culture and heritage is kept unclear. It’s the military who is making all the
biggest investments in tourism in the CHT.
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from the Bangla]
The increased presence of Bengali tourists also helped to normalize militarization
and accentuate its non-threatening appearance, something that I noticed during my
fieldwork. This, however, contradicts recent decisions by the military and administration
to restrict communication between Bengalis and Jummas. As Mong Shanoo Chowdhury
explained:
The main problem here is that the places where the [military] are developing
tourism, we the adibashis had been living there for a long time, they are evicting
us from there and carrying out this business. That is where our fundamental
objection lies. Chimbuk Pahar, Boga Lake, Sajek and several other places where
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the military has set up tourist spots, have they ever bothered to take permission
from the Hill District Council before setting these up? It clearly says in the CHT
Accord that permission from the HDC needs to be taken before anyone can set
this place up for tourism. Don’t you think there is a conflict here based on land?
But who is going to take any action against the military? Even the government is
afraid of them. The land issue is the main problem here and through this a lot of
other issues have popped up, so we really need to address the land problem very
seriously. The military is expanding their tourism business means they are
intensifying the land problems.
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla]
In 2012, the administration in an official notice declared that Bengalis and
foreigners from outside the CHT would be barred from speaking to Jummas without the
presence of government officials. This announcement was targeted towards journalists
and human rights activists who were reporting about the violence against the Jummas and
not meant for tourists, although they could not make this distinction clear and doing so
would again raise questions about their presence (Amnesty International, 2015).
Development related to tourism is meant for tourists only and not for the Jumma
peoples as Samari Chakma points out:
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All the development that is taking place in the Hills because of tourism does not
benefit the common people of the area. The portable water tank that was set up in
the Sajek area, the Jumma people do not have access to it. This water, these roads,
this electricity is not for me, it’s for the tourists only. Yes a few of them [the
Jummas] will get rich. If the state wanted to do something for our benefit they
would consult with us but they have don’t nothing of the sort.
The concern for most of the JSS activists I spoke with were about how the present
nature of tourism development in the Hills were not aligned with what was promised in
the Accord, and not an opposition to tourism per se. The Accord promised to hand over
the tourism subject to the Hill District Council and although in August 2014 it was
formally handed over, the real control of decisions related to tourism development really
lay with the government and the military. Sajeeb Chakma points out:
They handed over the subject to the three hill districts but they put on various
conditions on them. The powers of the Hill District Councils have been curtailed
through these conditions. In terms of taking decisions and deploying people the
powers mainly belong to the Parjatan Corporation [the government tourism
board]. Although the Accord says that decisions about tourism will be taken on
the basis of discussion between the HDC, the Ministry of CHT Affairs and the
Parjatan Corporation, it does not say anything about the Regional Council. So the
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way it stands now, the BGB, military or any company, private individual or a
government agency can set up tourist spots here.
Adnan and Dastidar (2010) point out that some of the largest takeovers of Jumma
people’s lands in the Hills have been through acquisition by various agencies of the state
including the Forest Department and the security forces:
In most cases, these state agencies activate formal land acquisition procedures
mediated by the office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC). However, in some
instances, these agencies have also taken over Pahari lands unlawfully, without
following the required land acquisition procedures (p. xviii).
The 1958 CHT (Land Acquisition) Regulation allows the DC to use their power
to acquire land without giving prior notice to the landowners and affected parties do not
have an option to appeal.
Imaginaries of Tourism and the Paradox of the Ethnic Other
Eid, the Muslim religious holiday, is a national sometimes weeklong holiday in
Bangladesh. Dhaka is emptied of its majority migrant population and people from all
walks of life go back to their village homes all over the country. The city, roughly the
size of London, Ontario and with a population of more than 10 million, wears an almost
deserted look on Eid morning. In recent times, the Bengali middle class have also started
vacationing outside Dhaka during Eid. Tour packages are promoted by using seductive
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images of the places and the indigenous peoples. Salazar and Graburn (2014) posit that
without “imaginaries” or “fantasies” it is almost impossible to think of tourism. While the
state and the elite use these fantasies about indigenous people to make profit and maintain
dominance, Bengali hegemony is used to construct the official national identity and
render the Jummas as the ethnic other (Yasmin, 2014; Tripura, 2016). In 2011, the
government officially denied the existence of indigenous people in Bangladesh and
District Commissioners were directed by the Intelligence Agency of the Home Ministry
not to celebrate World Indigenous People’s Day on August 9:
Steps should be taken to publicize/broadcast in the print and electronic media that
there are no Indigenous people in Bangladesh. The month of August is recognized
nationally as the month of mourning. Hence, such unnecessary celebration
programmes in the name of Indigenous Day in this month should be avoided.
(Official memo from ministry of LGRD, March 11, 2012)
It was important for the government to point out that remembering the ‘father of
the Bengali nation’ Sheikh Mujib was far more important than a celebration of the
indigenous people’s identity. Although the two days are on different dates of the month,
the celebration on one day would somehow blemish the solemnity of the other day. In
1984 in their report to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), the
Anti-Slavery Society of London criticized the Bangladesh delegation’s report where they
claim “Bangladesh has no indigenous population” (Faiz and Mohaiemen, 2010). Hall
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(2007) argues that tourism can silence indigenous voices with the romantic representation
of indigenous peoples used in tourism promotion but it has “substantial implications not
only for tourism but also for the longer-term development of indigenous identity and
well-being” (p. 318). Yasmin (2016) calls it the “tyranny of the majority” (p. 116) and
Tripura (2015) refers to:
…the singular and exclusionist conceptions of key notions such as ‘nationality’,
‘nationalism’, ‘state language’ and ‘national culture’, whereby the diversity of
languages and ethnic identities of the country are overlooked, or at best relegated
to a marginal and inferior status (p. 1).
Schendel (2015) has pointed out that in post-independence Bangladesh three firstgeneration historiographies emerged and played a dominant role in the national narrative.
The first of these and the one relevant for understanding Bengali tourism imaginaries in
the Hills is that of the Bengali national triumph over the Pakistanis and its implications
on the silencing of other narratives.
At the beginning of my fieldwork I was also able to speak to Sam Tripura in
Dhaka. Sam is a member of the Headman Association based in Khagrachari and received
reports from headmen in the other districts. He pointed out:
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Tourism in the Hills is carried out in areas where the most vulnerable people live.
You will see that in Bandarban it’s the Mro area that was targeted and Nilgiri was
set up there and in Sajek the Tripura and Pankhuya community were targeted.
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla]
Sam and a number of other respondents also pointed out that this business model
was also expanding into sex trafficking in the area and poor young Jumma girls were
being drawn into it while the local authorities were aware of it and possibly benefitting
from it. Sam mentioned to me that he had two reports of girls under the age of 18 having
been to Dighinala Hospital for abortion. Later it was discovered that the girls were
impregnated by tourists. He said that the parents were so poor that they had in fact given
consent to this act. Sam said that there were a number of these cases but the girls and
their families would be too ashamed to talk about this. Samari Chakma, a lawyer based in
Khagrachari said:
A lot of Jumma girls are increasingly forced into sex work because of tourism. A
lot of girls are trafficked and many of them are forced to become surrogate
mothers. Unfortunately, the NGOs who work here are not very interested in
working on these issues where they have to face the authorities, they want to work
on safer issues like the environment, where there is funding.
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Dawnai Prue Naly, a woman’s rights activist belonging to the Bohmong King’s
family ran a local organization involved in rescuing girls who were forced into sex
trafficking. I have known her since 2009 while I was working with the CHT Commission
and was aware of a number of rescue missions she was personally involved in and how
her own life had been endangered several times because of her work. She runs a training
program for young Jumma girls now. She explained that:
Because of tourism all kinds of people have started coming to Bandaraban and
they think of Jumma girls as something to consume. The rate of child prostitution
is rising very dangerously and there is also more rape in the area than before.
They think it is very easy to rape Jumma girls and get away with it. Recently a
Bengali man raped an 11-year-old girl. He came to Bandarban to drive cars for
tourists. I personally got him arrested. Unfortunately, the case is not strong
because there are no witnesses. We will probably lose the case. We are not able to
control this situation. It’s very difficult.
Rape in general has been used as a tool to oppress the Jumma population and rape
and other sexual violence has been instrumental in making Jumma communities leave
their homes and becoming refugees in other parts of the Hills and thereby facilitating the
grabbing of their lands for commercial purposes and for tourism (Chakma 2013).
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Cameras, Neo-Colonialism and the Tourist Gaze
In July 2016 during my fieldwork I attended a photo exhibition at DRIK Gallery.
The exhibition was titled, ‘Chittagong Hill Tracts: People and Nature’ and was organized
by MOCHTA, UNDP, USAID and Bangladeshi NGOs BRAC, Manusher Jonno
Foundation, Podokkhep and Bangladesh Adventure Club. The exhibition was clearly
catering to the Bengali middle-class tourists with pictures of the exotic Mro, naked
Jumma babies in swings and magnificent panoramic views of the Hills. None of the
photographs hinted at any of the political struggle and violence that has been plaguing the
lives of Jumma peoples for more than four decades. Mawani (2007) argues that nature is
a “key cultural signifier of a national distinctiveness, one that is highly racialized and
deeply rooted in British imperialism” (pg. 716). Mawani’s work is in reference to
invocation of nature and pristine national parks in Canada’s national narratives, but
which cover First Nations’ past and present struggles against colonial processes which
evicted them from their lands, which has parallels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other
places around the world.
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Figure 11: Photo exhibition at Dhaka
DRIK Gallery in July 2016 being
inspected by the Minister for Information,
the Minister and Secretary for CHT
Affairs and the press. The dignitaries are
wearing red and green (the color of
Bangladesh’s flag) hadi (Chakma shawl)

Photo: Aye Aye Maung, 2016.

The only photograph-worthy Jumma were the exotic ones in their decorative
jewelry and authentic clothes. Schendel, Mey & Dewan (2000) have argued that
photography was used for the first time in the Hills by Europeans as a way of
representing the hill people in a certain primitive way to feed a romanticised interest in
the natives and also garner support for colonial conquests. Much of the pictorial
anthropological representation of the Jummas from colonial times produce them as
“living specimens… exhibited in booths, neatly classified according to race and tribe” to
help develop theories on human evolution (Schendel, Mey & Dewan 2000). Devine
(2017) points out:
… representations of people and places in cultural and eco-tourism are often
essentialized and folkloric, reflect the preconceived and stereotypical imaginaries
of tourists, and are sold and performed in tours, postcards, sex and everyday
interactions (p. 2).
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Samari Chakma discusses the sense of entitlement that tourists have in the Hills
and the power relations that exist between Jummas and Bengalis in the field of tourism as
follows:
During Biju this year a friend from Dhaka and I were sitting somewhere and
talking when I suddenly noticed a man taking our photos from a distance. At first
I gestured at him to stop taking photos but then I noticed he was not paying
attention and continuing to take our photos. I went up to him and told him that he
needed to stop taking our photos. He simply responded to me by saying: “I’m a
tourist”. It was as if through his identity as a tourist he felt he was entitled to take
our photos and he couldn’t understand why I would object to it and wouldn’t even
acknowledge my right to privacy.
On the day we were leaving we noticed an added level of urgency among the
cleaning staff at our hotel. When asked about it, the hotel receptionist informed us that
the Sri Lankan army chief would be coming the following day. The receptionist eagerly
informed us that the army chief was a frequent visitor to Sajek. Every time he came to
Bangladesh to give talks at the Defence College he and his team of 30 army officers
visited Sajek. Incidentally, the Sri Lankan military has also taken up tourism in the
previously Tamil-held areas since they brutally defeated the Tamil Tigers in 2009, killing
nearly 40,000 Tamil civilians. Using tourism as a form of erasure of violence and
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normalization of military presence seems to be a way the state represses resistance
movements of minority groups.
In Sajek the military follows a strict timetable for tourists coming in and out of
the area. There are two arrival time and two departure time from Sajek – once at 11 in the
morning and once at 3 in the afternoon. Depending on which departure or arrival time
you wish to take you have to be present at the spot where all vehicles must assemble.
Military officers who are in charge of this service do it in a rather authoritarian way as I
noticed when we were getting prepared to head back to Khagrachari from Sajek. It was
almost 11:00 and all the cars were lined up in a very disciplined manner ready to take off
together. At that moment some young men got off their vehicles to take some last group
photos together. The army officer in charge of the assembly, probably the same age as the
young men, noticed it and yelled at them that if they did not immediately get into their
vehicle they would have to stay. The officer had a gun in his hand. The paradox of a
military establishment as tourist hosts once again became apparent from this hostile
exchange. The young got back into their vehicle without another word and the cars sped
off at exactly 11:00.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have used the case of Sajek Valley in the Chittagong Hill Tracts
to show how military-controlled tourism is an effort that has a number of aims: mainly to
reinforce the state’s sovereignty over Jumma territory, by confiscating their land, to
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exclude the Jumma peoples from the national imaginary as anything but exotic others and
erase the history and ongoing violence of the region. In contrast to the killing, torture, and
on-going colonization and exploitation of Jummas and their lands, the Bengali middleclass tourists are welcomed with lavish language of prefabricated dreams with a promise
of safety, security and leisure. In the Hills violence is an inherent part of present-day
tourism. The unresolved past and the present-day political dynamics constructs an ‘ethnic
conflict’ and unequal relationship between the Bengalis and Jummas and sanctions
unauthorised land-grabbing and violence by the state and Bengali elite. This framework
produces an asymmetrical relationship between the tourists and Jummas and leads to the
socio-spatial politics of structural and symbolic violence in the Hills.
In the conclusion, I will explain how this thesis illustrates how state-sponsored
tourism in the Hills has its roots in colonial methods of domination and representation
and how it has become a space for nationalist politics of assimilation exploitation, and
violence.
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Chapter 5: Concluding thoughts: The State and the Political Economy of Tourism
In June 2017, at the beginning of the monsoon season in Bangladesh, the news of
one of the worst landslides in the Chittagong Hill Tracts began to unfold. Bangladeshi
newspapers reported that within 24 hours a record high level of rain led to landslides in
areas all over the three hill districts killing more than 130 people (Time, 2017). Most of
the victims were poor Jumma people. There are very few environmental studies on the
impact of deforestation, hill-cutting, militarization and the overall population transfer that
the state has been carrying out since the 1970s. The loss of lives of the poor Jumma
people in this disaster did not seem to be of the utmost concern for the local
administration. While the military made sure that the names and pictures of the four
military personnel who were killed during a rescue operation was published widely
throughout the media, the names and faces of the other 126 victims did not hold as much
importance. I received messages from my activist colleagues in Bangladesh desperately
looking for funds to help the victims’ families in the absence of adequate government
support. While the nameless and faceless victims’ families were trying to come to terms
with the tragedy and while activists were frantically trying to raise funds for them, the
Civil Aviation and Tourism Minister Rashed Khan Menon raised concern in parliament
that through this disaster the tourism sector had incurred a loss of Tk 4 billion to Tk. 4.5
billion ($6.6 million CAD to $7.5 million CAD) due to the landslide in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts through damage to tourist facilities and cancellation of tourist reservations
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(The Daily Star, 09 July 2017). The state elite had clearly defined their concerns and
priorities in the disaster.
This thesis has dealt with the growing tourist industry in the Hills and its effects
and implications on the Jumma people’s lives and land in the backdrop of the
marginalized position they have in relation to the state. The popularity of the Hills as a
tourist destination began with the signing of the Accord, but initially growth was slow
and gradual. Prior to the CHT Accord, most of the ‘tourists’ were families of government
officials and military officers who were posted there, and who were able to use the
facilities provided exclusively to them. It was during that time that the political and
military elites speculated on the economic potentials of this sector. The vagueness in the
Accord regarding the legal status and allocation of land in the region, the corruption of
many government officials, a widespread indifference and considerable public consent
regarding militarization, justified by the state as a means of protecting its sovereignty,
and the overall global capitalist expansion of the tourism sector provided the ideal
circumstances for the ‘successful’ development of tourism in the Hills. While there is
vast research on the resistance and political conflict in the Hills by scholars from colonial
times, there is almost no academic research on tourism in the area, especially tourism as a
state strategy of domination, exploitation and violence. Literature on tourism in the Hills
as a means of exploitation have, however been appearing in the last five years in the form
of newspaper articles, opinions and in activist discussion which shows that this is an
emerging topic.
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This research project, therefore, is just the beginning of this exploration. I was
limited to some extent in my fieldwork because of the sensitivity of working in this
location, especially due to my previous involvement as the coordinator of the CHT
Commission. This role as an activist was a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it
facilitated access to my key informants. On the other hand, it limited my ability to
conduct fieldwork without raising concerns. Apart from my particular situation,
fieldwork, especially long-term ethnographic fieldwork, is still a challenge in the Hills for
anyone planning to conduct research independent of state sponsorship. Chowdhury
(2014) who spent twelve months conducting fieldwork in the Hills on the political
ecology of forests observes: “The power and influence of the army was the single most
difficult challenge in CHT since the army controls the region for security purposes” (p.
41). He said that his encounters with the military angered him because he felt like “a
foreigner in my own country” (p. 39). However, the challenges faced by academic
researchers, journalists and activists are themselves an indication of the oppression and
violence that lies behind the marketing of the Hills by the state as the best adventure
tourist destination of the country. Thus, I will take these challenges and limitations into
account when I conceptualize my PhD proposal and plan for fieldwork. This is necessary
not only to be politically-committed and morally engaged, but more importantly for
ethical purposes, that is, to ensure the physical safety of everyone concerned.
There are far-reaching implications of military-controlled tourism on the power
dynamics between the state and the Jummas in an area of protracted ‘conflict’. State
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power is enacted and reproduced through tourism and it is used by the state as a strategy
for dominating the region. Tourism essentially plays the role of reinforcing
administrative, social and political hierarchies and renders the Jumma population worthy
of the tourist gaze. The Bengali elite perceives the Jumma people as primarily objects of
tourist consumption with no political rights, or rights to their traditional lands. Thus, it
has categorically denied them recognition in the constitution, marginalized them
economically and politically, represented them as the ethnic other, criminalized them
through the media in order to justify the securitization of the Hills. In order to continue its
repression and exploitation, the Bangladeshi state fuels nationalist passions, and invokes
a narrative in which ‘sovereignty’ and a Muslim-Bengali identity that is threatened by
indigenous claims are key elements. Resorting to such nationalist rhetoric is quite
common in post-colonial countries in areas where indigenous people have led movements
for self-determination demanding recognition of communal land ownership rights, or
political and administrative autonomy.
As Hall (2007) argues indigenous tourism is highly problematic because of the
paternalistic or colonial nature of tourism that arises from differential power relations
among the tourist, governmental authorities, and the indigenous inhabitants. However,
Hall is aware of the dangers in homogenizing communities, and therefore calls for
identifying “power relations within indigenous communities and the use and misuse of
power relations” (p. 317). The study of tourism has been approached from many different
angles. As part of the global ‘development’ agenda, largely controlled by powerful and
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rich states, there is a big thrust for diversifying the types of tourism including
‘community-based tourism’ and ‘eco-tourism’. Tourism in politically volatile situations is
especially encouraged as a way of normalizing relations between oppressors and the
oppressed. The ‘developmental’ propaganda attached to it and its public displays of
exotics and sites, is often packaged in ways that suppress and obscure the history of
violence and oppression. Tourism also is a way to restore unequal power relations, to
prevent future resistance movements, and to evade accountability. Palestine, Sri Lanka,
Kashmir in India and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh provide clear examples of
the more destructive aspects of tourism.
An anthropological approach to tourism is appropriate for it enables the
researcher to look holistically at a particular case, and to incorporate historical economic,
political, and sociocultural dynamics. Fieldwork is particularly important as it enables the
researcher to observe how these dynamics play out in daily life and in the real world. My
fieldwork gave me a better insight as to how power relations work between state
authorities, tourists and locals. Some of my interviews clearly revealed these power
dynamics, as well as the resentment and anger of the Jumma people for the continuous
encroachment on their land, for being marginalized and minoritized by the state, and for
being reduced to exotic figures in the Bengali tourist imaginary.
This thesis shows how state-sponsored tourism in the Hills has its roots in
colonial methods of domination and representation, or colonial forms of knowledge. The
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Hills are a very distinctive political, social and cultural space which is being exploited for
its natural and cultural resources and at the same time is the space of a nationalist politics
of assimilation exploitation, and violence. Although it is not possible in an MA thesis to
cover the topics in great detail, nonetheless, I have provided an overview of the critical
aspects related to the historical and political context of the Jumma people beginning with
the non-statehood then to limited administrative power under the Mughal period. I briefly
examined relevant events and policies under British colonization, which led to the
partition of India into a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan and the eventual creation of
‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’, including in Pakistan, which led to the secession of Bengalispeaking people in East Pakistan, renamed Bangladesh, a country that over time turned
into a state in which democratic rights gave way to militarization and authoritarianism.
This trajectory is important to understand the policies of the Bangladeshi state in the
CHT, and its national tourism project which camouflages land expropriation and
violence.
In Chapter 1 of the thesis I outlined my research, its objectives, methods and the
theoretical framework. In Chapter 2, I summarized the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial trajectory which led to militarization in the Hills, where violence continues to be
inflicted on the Jumma peoples. This trajectory is especially important to understand the
present repression and subjugation of the Jumma. The state was able to mobilize support
for its repression of the Jumma and militarization in the CHT by inciting nationalist
fervor depicting the Jummas as a threat to Bengali-Muslim identity, a narrative that has
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been internalized by many people. The current nationalist rhetoric has its history in postParition nation-state building, where centralization emerged and justified as necessary to
prevent further secession. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I presented the main findings
drawn from my fieldwork and analysed them using scholars and anthropologists writing
on the region. In Chapter 3 my fieldwork revealed the level of surveillance and control
that is experienced in the Hills and how the same surveillance gives a sense of security to
Bengali tourists but has a threatening meaning for the Jummas. Chapter 4 looks at the
nature of military-based tourism in the Hills through the ethnographic work I conducted
in Sajek, which has emerged as one of the most popular military-sponsored tourist
destinations in the Hills since 2013. In this context, I describe and analyze two large-scale
arson attacks in the region in 2008 and 2010 and their implications for the Jumma and
tourism. I look at the structural and symbolic violence in the very nature of tourism in the
area, where Jumma culture has been commodified for tourist consumption. This has been
achieved largely by justifying and/or absenting the violent history in the region, and
denying the rights of the Jummas.
While British colonization, the Partition and colonial categorizations had a
snowball effect on the relationship between the post-colonial states in South Asia and
their minoritized communities, the political and economic interest of these centralized
states and the overall shift to global capitalism has led to the exploitation of land and
commodification of indigenous cultures. In the specific case of tourism in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts of Bangladesh the state has categorically denied the Jumma people the rights
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to their identity and autonomy and followed a path of forced assimilation and co-optation
in the field of tourism. While the Government of Bangladesh signed an Accord to resolve
the conflict that led to two decades of military violence in the Hills, opposition to a
hastily drafted Accord, failure to implement its most important clauses, and the BengaliMuslim chauvinism in dealing with the issues raised by the Jummas has led to the present
paradoxical situation of tourism in the Hills. My scholarly contribution through this thesis
has been to explore this paradox using an anthropological approach, in which fieldwork
was key to illuminate how power is manifested, and by drawing on my previous
experiences as activist in this field, and existing theoretical and ethnographic literature.
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Appendices

Appendix A (Acronyms)
ADB

Asian Development Bank

BA

Bangladesh Army

BAL

Bangladesh Awami League

BBS

Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

BNP

Bangladesh Nationalist Party

CHT

Chittagong Hill Tracts

CHTDB

Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board

CHTIC

Chittagong Hill Tracts Intelligence Committee

DC

Deputy Commissioner

DGFI

Directorate General of Forces Intelligence

DSB

District Special Branch

FB

Facebook

HDC

Hill District Council

PCJSS

Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity

MOCHTA

Ministry Of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs

NGO

Non-government organization

NSI

National Security Intelligence
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RC

Regional Council

RIC

Regional Intelligence Committee

SMF

Strategic Management Forum

UNPFII

United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

UPDF

United Peoples Democratic Front

USAID

United States Agency for International Development
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Appendix B: Maps related to the research

Map 1: Map of Bangladesh
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Map 2: Map of Rangamati
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Map 3: Map of Sajek.
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Map 4: Google Earth view of Ruilui Para, Sajek.

Map 5: Map of Ruilui Para, Sajek. Credit: Sanjib Debnath.
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